

The Beginning of Israeli Trends Towards Ethiopia 1955-1958

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Abstract

Israel is a small and newly established state, and being a landlocked country, it has sought since its founding to find an area for expansion that serves its security interests and need for water simultaneously. Therefore, the Horn of Africa has held significant importance in (Israeli) foreign policy from early on. Consequently, (Israeli) political decision-makers have adopted specific policies to engage with the region in accordance with well-planned objectives for infiltration. The region is strategically important due to its location along the shores of the Red Sea on one side and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden on the other, paving the way for its connection to the (Israeli) national security system. Thus, Ethiopia has become Israel's gateway to Africa, representing a unique case in the trajectory of (Israeli)-African relations due to the numerous shared and overlapping interests it encompasses, culminating in claims of historical, religious, and security ties between Israel and Ethiopia. Furthermore, Ethiopia is considered one of the most vital areas in the Horn of Africa and a main source country in the Nile Basin, which has subsequently made the relationship between the governments of Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa a model for Israel's relations with African nations.

Keywords: Ethiopia, Israel, Ocean Alliance

Introduction

The importance of studying (Israeli) politics towards Ethiopia from 1955 to 1958 lies in the significant role that Ethiopia plays in (Israeli) strategy, stemming from its geopolitical position that shaped a vital perspective in the concept of (Israeli) national security. Furthermore, Emperor Haile Selassie I was one of the greatest African leaders and had early ties with Israel, even adopting the title "Asfaha Iuda" to emphasize the religious connection between Israel and Ethiopia. Despite these factors, the relationship did not fully take shape until after the Bandung Conference in 1955, when a series of elements facilitated Israel's infiltration into the continent and garnered international support.

Thus, the research idea emerged, which is divided into two main themes, along with an introduction and conclusion. The first theme is titled

"Zionist Consular Representation in Ethiopia and the Beginning of Relations (1955-1958)," while the second theme covers the "Oceanic Alliance (1958)."

First: The Zionist Consular Representation in Ethiopia and the Beginning of Relations Development (1955-1958)

The turning point towards Ethiopia's partial and ambiguous recognition of the de facto rule of the Zionist entity was not limited to previous Zionist relations and assistance alone. It emerged as a result of the indirect yet profound conflict between Egypt and the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, following the rise of the new Egyptian government to power in July 1952. Egypt began its pursuit of supremacy in three circles: Arab, African, and Muslim, aiming to become the leader of what became known during the 1950s as the "Third World" of non-aligned nations⁽¹⁾.

In this context, the most significant event that led to a major shift in Zionist diplomacy towards the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular was the convening of the Bandung Conference in 1955 in Indonesia. Twenty-five countries were invited to attend the conference, and the primary consideration in selecting potential participants was the desire to invite all independent countries in Asia and Africa to participate, with each country represented by its Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. The list included (Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Yemen)⁽²⁾.

It is noteworthy that the Zionist state was not invited to this significant historical event, despite Burma's insistence on extending an invitation, as the socialist government of Burma maintained a very close relationship with the (Israeli) administration. Additionally, there was a personal friendly relationship between Ben-Gurion and the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu⁽³⁾. The latter had assured the (Israeli) ambassador in Rangoon, prior to his departure to Bogor, that Burma would not participate in the Afro-Asian conference unless Israel was invited. However, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru⁽⁴⁾ was the one who tilted the balance against Israel. Although he opposed the exclusion of Israel, as he publicly stated, he argued that Israel's participation would lead to the rejection of all Arab states from

participating in the conference. After much persuasion, during which the potential consequences of such an action were highlighted, U Nu withdrew his proposal⁽⁵⁾.

Earlier, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Abdel Khalek Hassouna⁽⁶⁾, announced on January 12, 1954, that the Arab League Council had agreed to the participation of Arab countries. Three weeks prior to this announcement, the Indian ambassador in Cairo was summoned to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who informed him that Egypt would refuse to participate if the Zionists were invited⁽⁷⁾. Furthermore, the conference was officially inaugurated on April 18, 1955, by Indonesian President Sukarno⁽⁸⁾ and Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, and it continued until April 24 of the same year⁽⁹⁾. In its concluding statement, the conference condemned the Zionist state, referring to the Zionists' occupation of Arab lands and considering it an unwanted entity, which contributed to the tightening of the isolation around it and shocked the Zionist decision-makers⁽¹⁰⁾.

(Israeli) Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett stated, "The Bandung Conference represented the greatest diplomatic setback for us, as more than two and a half billion people came together in opposition to approximately 1.8 million (Israeli) s. This, in itself, was a demoralizing event for our foreign policy." At that time, Zionist leaders recognized the imperative for political engagement with African nations, as these countries represented influential voices in international forums and conferences during a period when Israel required robust international support. This sentiment was echoed by (Israeli) Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who emphasized the need to reach out to Africa by stating, "African countries may not be powerful, but their voices in international organizations and institutions carry equal weight to those of more powerful and influential nations worldwide."⁽¹¹⁾

Gamal Abdel Nasser's⁽¹²⁾ personality emerged prominently at the Bandung Conference, positioning the Egyptian president alongside leaders from India, China, and Yugoslavia as a notable international figure and a source of inspiration for youth and revolutionaries worldwide. Upon returning from the Afro-Asian Conference, Nasser greenlit Egyptian activities in Africa, particularly in the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, Haile Selassie began to exert absolute authority over Eritrean society, dismantling its parliament, and establishing Amharic as Eritrea's

official language in place of Tigrinya and Arabic, while marginalizing the predominantly Muslim half of the population. These actions, among others undertaken by the Ethiopian emperor, provoked Nasser. A significant factor in this discontent was the burgeoning Ethiopian economic relations with Israel, which became particularly evident in 1954. Consequently, Egypt began to support Eritrea, leading to the establishment of the Eritrean Liberation Front in Cairo, nourished by Nasser and Arab nationalism. As described by Muhammad Faque, one of Nasser's key aides for African affairs, Nasser decided in 1955 to encourage the organization of an Eritrean community opposed to the Ethiopians from the diaspora in Cairo. Nasser himself, however, did not focus his priorities in that direction and did not seek open confrontation with Haile Selassie, although he regarded the Ethiopian emperor, in secret, as an adversary⁽¹³⁾.

Meanwhile, the Muslim youth in Eritrea had already begun fleeing their country and traveling to Cairo from Sudan. Nasser decided to make their lives easier in higher education institutions in the capital, primarily at Al-Azhar. Approximately 700 Eritrean students received assistance from the Nasser regime, obtaining scholarships, jobs, and other benefits, along with access to a special club encouraging them to hold meetings there, known as the New Eritrea House. Another decision made by Nasser in 1955 was to welcome Eritrean Christian politicians who were compelled to flee into exile due to the imperialist takeover of their country by the Ethiopians⁽¹⁴⁾.

On June 8, 1955, the Voice of the Arabs radio station⁽¹⁵⁾ in Egypt announced that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry had clarified that Ethiopia would not recognize the Zionists. At the same time, this stance was more than what Haile Selassie could tolerate, as he became increasingly concerned about the Nasserist threat. Three weeks later, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Akililu Habte Woid⁽¹⁶⁾ sent a message to his Zionist counterpart via the consulate in Jerusalem, stating that the Egyptian announcement was a distortion of the truth. On November 1 of the same year, the Emperor Haile Selassie sent a note through the consulate in Jerusalem inviting a Zionist delegation to Addis Ababa to discuss future relations between the two countries. At the same time, he instructed the consul to inform the (Israeli) s that Ethiopia would still not recognize Israel under international law⁽¹⁷⁾.

On November 22, 1955, the (Israeli) state sent a delegation to Ethiopia, comprising Arthur Lourie, the Deputy Director General of the (Israeli) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Daniel Lewin, the Director of the African and Asian Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They met with Emperor Haile Selassie, who assured them that Arab imperialism posed a threat to Ethiopia, particularly from Egypt. In response to the concerns raised by the Zionist delegation, the Emperor noted that while Ethiopian Jews had always been friends, the Arabs were in constant conflict among themselves. He also mentioned that European countries had exaggerated the self-image of the Arabs at a time when they wielded little power. However, Haile Selassie emphasized that the Arabs should still be taken into consideration⁽¹⁸⁾.

Commenting on the above, we find that Emperor Haile Selassie has a significant contradiction regarding his stance on the Arabs; at times he describes their power as minimal, while at other times he acknowledges a considerable strength among them that should be taken into account, and this should be respected by the Zionists.

In this context, the Zionist delegation approached Ethiopian Foreign Minister Akililu Habte. At that time, the delegation suggested that Ethiopia officially recognize Israel, demonstrating its intention to consider Zionists as members of the international community and to facilitate the existing interests between them. Such a de facto recognition is practiced by some countries that acknowledge the existence of a new state with a political organization in a specific region⁽¹⁹⁾.

Moreover, they proposed the exchange of diplomatic representatives between them, duly approved by the local authorities. However, Aklilu suggested instead the appointment of liaison officials enjoying diplomatic privileges and full powers for each government, considering this proposal to be the result of a decision already made by Emperor Haile Selassie. In response, Lori and Levin stated that their government would not agree to this proposal and that they preferred to establish relations at the consular level, believing that this proposal might be approved by the Zionist government. Initially, Foreign Minister Aklilu agreed to the (Israeli) proposal, pending the approval of Emperor Haile Selassie. In the meantime, the latter agreed to

the actual recognition of (Israel) and the establishment of mutual representation between the two countries⁽²⁰⁾.

In the meantime, Israel hurried to establish its consulate in Addis Ababa, not only to manage diplomatic activities but also to support trade relations between the two countries⁽²¹⁾. It was officially opened on May 16, 1956, with Reuven Pilpoul appointed as its first Consul General in Ethiopia. On the other hand, Marcus Agagyellow was designated as the Consul General of Ethiopia in Israel, and he was welcomed by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett upon his arrival in Israel. He assumed his duties on June 5 of the same year, and the Ethiopian government chose Jerusalem as the location for its consulate⁽²²⁾.

In light of this, we must raise the question: Why did Ethiopia choose Jerusalem as the location for its consulate? Was this choice intended to silence the Arab street regarding official recognition of (Israel)?

To answer this, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister justified his country's move by stating that Addis Ababa has had a general consul ⁽²³⁾ in Jerusalem for a long time, even before the establishment of the Zionist state. Furthermore, the Zionist government threatened Ethiopia with the establishment of a dedicated consul in Addis Ababa or the closure of the Ethiopian consulate in Jerusalem. Consequently, Ethiopia felt compelled to respond to the (Israeli) request under coercive circumstances that necessitated the continuation of its accredited general consulate in (Israel) to safeguard Ethiopia's interests and those of its people, as well as the sacred religious sites located in Jerusalem under the control of the Zionist state⁽²⁴⁾.

We can see from this response a clear justification fabricated by the Ethiopian government to confront any Arab objection or face any Arab opposition standing in its way.

In the same context, the (Israeli) Consul General in Addis Ababa began notable activities immediately upon assuming his duties, as he gained influence and social standing that was not enjoyed by ambassadors of major countries. His primary mission was to improve (Israeli) relations with Ethiopia and to penetrate the African continent through it, as Africa's markets presented a special opportunity for Israel to sell its products and thus enhance its economy⁽²⁵⁾.

It is worth noting that shortly after his appointment, the Zionist consul in Ethiopia received two consecutive invitations, the first to attend a ceremony hosted by Imperial regime officers, and the second from Emperor Haile Selassie himself to attend a military parade on November 13, 1956. The invitation was extended only to heads of accredited diplomatic missions. Consequently, the (Israeli) entity considered this invitation a historic step toward supporting relations between the two countries and a significant indicator of Haile Selassie's desire to advance relations with Tel Aviv⁽²⁶⁾.

"This clearly explains the Ethiopian government's desire to publicly disclose its political relations with Israel and to cling to the latter, especially with the growing influence of Egypt under the sponsorship of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In this context, in the autumn of 1956, the Tripartite Aggression⁽²⁷⁾ (Britain, France, and Israel) launched its attack on Egypt on November 29, 1956, marking the beginning of what is known as the Suez Crisis⁽²⁸⁾.

In this regard, we must pose the question: How did the Suez Crisis affect Ethiopia? Did it have an impact on the development of Ethiopian-Zionist relations?

The Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956 had a significant impact on the beginning of a new phase in the history of relations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Arabs. Despite the fact that the war ended with a military defeat for Gamal Abdel Nasser, he emerged from it with a stronger popular image and an increasing political capital. The United States and the Soviet Union compelled the armies of his adversaries, Britain, France, and Israel, to withdraw from Egypt. Subsequently, the Egyptian leader became a global symbol of the anti-colonial struggle and the Arab revolutionary. Nasser clearly aspired to lead the Arab, Islamic, and African circles. Furthermore, this kind of connection between the Middle East and Africa—between Islam and Arabism, and between a revolutionary leader and local Islamic forces—constituted a long-term nightmare for the Christian establishment in Ethiopia.⁽²⁹⁾ "

In the same context, while Nasser was riding the wave of regional admiration, the Emperor was also seeking allies in reality. The performance of Israel during the Triple Aggression against Egypt in 1956 piqued Haile Selassie's interest, leaving him with a favorable impression, as he expressed.

He noted with concern the rise of Arab nationalism in the Middle East, where it seemed that Nasser's momentum was unifying Arab forces and enhancing Egypt's activity in East Africa, which the Emperor viewed as an increase in Nasser's influence in that region and a rapprochement with Ethiopia⁽³⁰⁾.

It is noteworthy that during that period, specifically in 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser attempted to draw Haile Selassie into a military alliance that would also include Sudan. However, he received a response from the Ethiopian ambassador stating that "although we drink from the same waters of the Nile as Egypt... we do not belong to your world."⁽³¹⁾

In response to the above, Ethiopia has always viewed the Zionists as partners in a shared destiny, given that it is a non-Islamic state surrounded by Muslim neighbors who pose a constant threat to its regional security. This was particularly evident with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Arab region, who was regarded as a national symbol. Consequently, Ethiopia's approach towards (Israel) became more developed, as the latter represented an important and pivotal element in its security policies.

In this context, one of the repercussions of the Suez Crisis on Ethiopia and Israel was the evolution of their security relations. The Ethiopian Chief of Staff expressed his admiration for the Zionists during the war in a conversation with the Zionist consul in Ethiopia, Reuven Pilpoul⁽³²⁾.

In their pursuit to enhance their security presence in Ethiopia, the Zionists had a relatively early intelligence presence in the country. At that time, Ethiopia served as a convenient hub for clandestine Zionist activities throughout Africa and the Middle East. These activities began under the guise of the company In coda, an Ethiopian meat-exporting company that was one of the most successful in that field. Although it appeared on the surface that the (Israeli) government owned shares in the company, the reality was that the Mossad⁽³³⁾ owned it behind the scenes⁽³⁴⁾. Between 1955 and 1964, the Mossad used In coda as a successful commercial front for intelligence operations. One of its directors stated, "In coda was an (Israeli) intelligence station in Africa, and we had a large weapons cache there when we arrived. Our name was used to cover the Mossad's covert operations, and when the Mossad wanted to send someone to an Arab country, they would choose from among our men."⁽³⁵⁾

The official cooperation between the Mossad and Ethiopia began in February 1957. Ethiopian representatives approached Yosef Nahmias, a senior Mossad officer in Europe, and requested the establishment of a secret communication channel. At the same time, Emperor Haile Selassie encouraged the (Israeli) businessman Azriel Inav, one of the owners of the Enkoda company who had begun investing in farms in Ethiopia, to establish contacts with the Mossad. Following this, Isser Harel⁽³⁶⁾, the head of the Mossad, traveled to Addis Ababa and met with Haile Selassie⁽³⁷⁾. However, the Ethiopians continued to conceal the nature of their relations with the Jewish state and still refused to recognize Israel legally. Nevertheless, the level of trust between the two sides developed significantly, and within a short period, the Ethiopians placed their most sensitive and important internal and external security issues in the hands of Israel, as well as in many other areas⁽³⁸⁾.

Second: The Ocean Alliance 1958:

In the late 1950s, Zionist leaders formulated a geopolitical survival strategy to address the revolutionary Arab unity that began to pose a real threat to them, even more than Ethiopia. In response to this threat, they worked to establish comprehensive relations with non-Arab countries surrounding the Middle East (Ethiopia, Turkey, Iran) based on a plan aimed at encircling the neighboring Arab countries through the Ocean Alliance⁽³⁹⁾.

The alliance was on the mind of David Ben-Gurion and his close advisors, particularly Reuven Shiloah, the founder of the Mossad, and Isser Harel, the head of the Mossad. Israel aimed to expand its regional influence, and the peripheral alliance reflected Ben-Gurion and Shiloah's assessment of key events in the Middle East. The year 1958 witnessed a wave of extremism in the Arab world and a period of setbacks for the Zionists. The unification of Syria and Egypt in February of that year, the revolution in Iraq, and the subsequent union between Iraq and Jordan, along with the increasing Soviet power, signaled a coordinated attempt by Israel to build alliances with Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey. From Ben-Gurion's perspective, such an alliance held added value in convincing the West that Israel represented a strategic asset opposing the Soviets, that it was an acceptable entity in Asia and Africa, and that there was sufficient momentum to bolster the Zionist state and support its initiative⁽⁴⁰⁾.

It is noteworthy that the precise origins of the term "peripheral doctrine" (Torat Haperipheria), or the peripheral alliance, are not clear and that Shiloah may have coined it. In its early stages, it simply emerged as an accurate description of what was evolving on the ground and on the map. Ben-Gurion and his advisors were convinced that Israel's Arab neighbors, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, were not candidates for peace treaties or even serious peaceful coexistence. On the contrary, after their failure to destroy the newly founded Jewish state in 1948, they sought to suffocate it through economic boycotts and by launching guerrilla attacks across its borders, arming themselves for this purpose⁽⁴¹⁾.

In the same context, David Ben-Gurion sent a letter on July 26, 1958, to French President Charles de Gaulle⁽⁴²⁾ and the leaders of the United States, outlining the details of the proposed alliance. He stated that the aim was to establish a group of countries, not necessarily a formal or public alliance, but rather nations capable of resisting Soviet expansion through Gamal Abdel Nasser. Furthermore, he noted that Nasser aspired to dominate the Islamic world, the Arab world, and Africa, with the Soviet Union backing him. If Nasser was not contained, the independence of Ethiopia would be undermined, as Nasser was already intervening in Eritrea, Djibouti, and British and Ethiopian Somalia (Ogaden), relying on a core of Muslims within Ethiopia itself. In response to these threats, the Zionist state began to strengthen its relationships with two non-Arab Muslim countries (Iran and Turkey) and a Christian country (Ethiopia) in order to establish a barrier against the Nasserite or Soviet tide⁽⁴³⁾.

In light of the above, it is essential to raise the question: What is the true nature of Turkish-Iranian relations with Israel that elevates them to the level of an alliance and makes them a part of the surrounding coalition?

(Israeli) contacts with Iran began in 1948, but they did not reach a level of genuine rapprochement until the late 1960s. However, 1957 witnessed an enhancement of communications between the two countries, which later developed into an unwritten agreement in September 1957. A meeting was held in Paris between Iranian Deputy Prime Minister General Teymur Bakhtiar and the (Israeli) ambassador in Paris, Yaakov Tsur. The head of the Mossad station in Paris, Yaakov Karoz, also attended the meeting, and he later coordinated all communications with Iran. Moreover,

meetings were renewed in October of the same year with a meeting in Rome between Bakhtiar and Karoz, and in December, Karoz visited Tehran. In 1958, an (Israeli) trade mission was opened in Tehran, which remained the official cover for (Israeli) operations for years.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Due to the events of 1958, David Ben-Gurion wrote a personal letter to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi⁽⁴⁵⁾ proposing a closer alliance in light of the threats facing the Arab world. In December 1958, the Iranian government decided to reactivate its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv, which had remained dormant since 1951. Despite the absence of official diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel, the presence of an (Israeli) embassy in Tehran was well-known. Thus, Iran was seen as a significant hope for the strategy of the “Periphery Alliance⁽⁴⁶⁾.”

As for Turkey, it was an ideal element in Ben-Gurion's strategy, situated on the outskirts of the region, being non-Arab and pro-Western, as well as possessing substantial military capabilities. There were no special communications until the late 1950s, and official diplomatic representation between Turkey and Israel was always at the chargé d'affaires level. In 1958, there was a secret visit to Turkey by Golda Meir, Israel's Foreign Minister, on August 29, 1958, during which a secret agreement was reached between Prime Ministers David Ben-Gurion and Adnan Menderes⁽⁴⁷⁾, calling for cooperation between Israel and Turkey against extremism in the Middle East and Soviet influence. Furthermore, the Turkish-(Israeli) relations were not as mature compared to those with Iran.⁽⁴⁸⁾

It is undoubtedly true that the (Israeli) strategic and intelligence alliance with Iran and Turkey was the most comprehensive and far-reaching accomplishment of the Ocean Alliance Strategy (the Northern Alliance) known as the Trident Alliance, which emerged in the context of high-level (Israeli) communications with Tehran and Ankara during the period of 1956-1958.⁽⁴⁹⁾

On the other hand, in parallel with its pursuit of the Northern Triangle through the Trident Alliance with Turkey and Iran, the Mossad sought to establish a Southern Triangle Alliance with Ethiopia. The Trident focused its intelligence cooperation primarily on Syria and Iraq, as well as Soviet penetration in the Middle East, with Egypt being a secondary concern. In contrast, the rationale behind the Southern Triangle was the ability to present

the existence of southern Egypt, even in the eyes of the Egyptians, as a potential threat to the waters of the Nile from the south, while also supporting Christian Ethiopia in its struggle against the Arab Islamic world. Equally pressing was the need to secure a safe (Israeli) corridor through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, which facilitated energy imports from Iran to Eilat, the emerging southern port of (Israel)⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Consequently, we find that the so-called "Pacific Alliance" was, in fact, one of four interconnected major strategies that emerged within (Israeli) security circles during Ben Gurion's era in the first decade of the country's existence. These strategies subsequently directed (Israeli) security behavior and were part of the broader (Israeli) strategic records. However, in reality, relations with Turkey were not as mature, unlike those with Iran, where relations deepened significantly. Additionally, the United States and other Western powers rejected the Zionists' attempts to form an alliance against the Arab world. On the other hand, Washington began its own regional alliance through the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁽⁵¹⁾

In the course of developing (Israeli) -Ethiopian security relations, the Zionists provided developmental assistance and maintained close ties with Ethiopian security forces⁽⁵²⁾. In 1958, a group of (Israeli) security experts was sent to Ethiopia to lay the initial foundations for Ethiopian security institutions. The Consul General, Rufin Bilbul, was replaced by Mossad operative Hanan Bar-On, who became the Consul General in Ethiopia and head of the Mossad mission there. As a Mossad agent, Bar-On assisted the head of Ethiopian security in expanding and restructuring its apparatus in a swift manner. By the end of 1958, Zionist experts arrived in Ethiopia, where they served as advisors alongside leaders of the security agencies of Emperor Haile Selassie, including Mengistu Newy⁽⁵³⁾, the commander of the Imperial Guard, Colonel Wregene Gabayahe, head of the Public Security Service, and Nisira Debo, head of the Ethiopian police⁽⁵⁴⁾.

Under pressure from the Ethiopians who demanded more assistance in intelligence planning, combating insurgency, and identifying foreign agents, particularly from Egypt as they claimed, Eli Zaira, head of the (Israeli) Defense Forces delegation in Ethiopia, presented a plan to David Ben-Gurion to reorganize the Ethiopian security forces and prepare intelligence training courses. Consequently, members of the (Israeli) internal security

agency Shin Bet and the Mossad began training their Ethiopian counterparts and holding courses in planning and organization. By 1959, commercial and economic activities had increased, and in March of that year, a memorandum of understanding was signed for Solel Boneh projects between the two parties. Extensive infrastructure projects were implemented throughout the country, and this activity was conducted in a quasi-secret and unofficial manner, without full Ethiopian recognition of (Israel). The (Israeli) Defense Forces mission operated under the auspices of Solel Boneh, and the officers (Israeli) did not wear their official uniforms, only field attire while working⁽⁵⁵⁾.

On November 24, 1960, the Second Ethiopian Paratroopers Brigade completed its training at Tel Nof Air Base in Israel. This event was significant enough for David Ben-Gurion to attend and deliver a speech to the guest officers and soldiers. Ben-Gurion stated, "The relationship between our two peoples is not limited to the meeting between King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba; both peoples face the same danger from the Nasserist regime, which is centered near our southern border, not far from your northern border. The Suez War, which we carried out four years ago, diminished Nasser's standing and reduced his influence among Arab nations, yet he holds in his hand another dangerous weapon, one that he may specifically target at us, which is the weapon of Islamic extremism. Although Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser has suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood in his country and executed its leaders, he uses them for subversion in other countries. He is trying to provoke Islamic extremism among your neighbors and against your country, your people, and your independence. Therefore, our two peoples are interconnected in sharing the same goal, and we know that every assistance provided to you is also assistance to us."⁽⁵⁶⁾ At the end of his remarks, Ben-Gurion requested that the Ethiopian paratroopers, upon their return to their homeland, convey his sincere blessings to Haile Selassie⁽⁵⁷⁾.

Conclusion

Through the examination and analysis of the research components, in light of the various questions raised by the subject under study, a number of key findings and conclusions have been reached, which can be summarized as follows:

- The study demonstrated that since its establishment, Israel has engaged in a diplomatic war to persuade Ethiopia to recognize it. However, the latter hesitated to take that step out of fear of Arab nations. Thus, it is evident that the awareness of the Zionists is always contextualized within their understanding of the dimensions of the conflict between them and the Arabs on one hand, and their search for any opportunity that allows them to assert their unwanted existence and entity in the Arab and Asian world. This was particularly evident during the Bandung Conference, where they found in Africa in general, and Ethiopia in particular, the potential for international advantage.

- The Suez Crisis opened the gateway to Asia and Africa for the Zionists and served to enhance their security and economic interests in the region in general and in Ethiopia specifically. Consequently, Ethiopia has become a primary target in their strategic thinking, and they have sought to develop their policies towards it openly

- The study indicated that the alliance of the "Northern Triangle," especially the Turkish-Iranian-Zionist relationship, lacked any substantial joint action apart from a few intelligence meetings that did not reach the level of a real alliance. Furthermore, the rejection by the United States played a role in preventing a true understanding of the shape of this alliance. In contrast, the "Southern Triangle," which binds them to Ethiopia, shows that the relations between the Zionist and Ethiopian sides are continually evolving.

Endnotes

(¹) Jack.Homer. A, Bandung: an on-the-spot description of the Asian-African Conference Bandung Indonesia April 1955, Toward Freedom, Chicago, 1955, p2.

(²) Ibid; p:5.

(3)U Nu:1907-1995was a Burmese politician born in Wakema, who studied at the University of Yangon. He led the government three times: from 1948 to 1956, then from 1957 to 1958, and finally from 1960 to 1962. For more information, see: J.A.S. Grunfeld, The Great Military Historical Encyclopedia of the Events of the Twentieth Century, translated by Ali Maqlid, Vol. 3, Dar Al-Arabiya for Encyclopedias, Beirut, P.205

<https://ar.m.wikipediaorg>

(4)Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was an Indian politician born in Allahabad. He studied at Harrow School before being sent to Britain to study natural sciences and law at the

University of Cambridge. Nehru became actively involved in peaceful opposition against colonial rule and faced multiple arrests as a result of his activism. He was elected President of the Indian National Congress in 1929 and was appointed as the chief negotiator for the party to lead discussions on the transfer of power from the British. He became the President of the Interim Government and the first Prime Minister of independent India on August 15, 1947. He passed away in 1964. For more information, see: Intisar Ali Abdul Najm Al-Mashhadani, "Jawaharlal Nehru and His Positions on Arab Issues," unpublished Master's thesis, College of Education Ibn Rushd, Baghdad University, 2002.

(5)Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty years' Indonesian foreign policy, 1945-1965*, Indonesia: Duta Wacana University Press, Yogyakarta, 1990, p215.

(6)Abdel Khalek Hassouna (1989-1992) was an Egyptian politician and diplomat born in Cairo. After completing his secondary education, he was sent to Britain to study political science at the University of Cambridge in 1925. He was part of the first diplomatic mission for the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Britain. He served as the Governor of Alexandria from 1942 to 1948 and was appointed Minister of Social Affairs in 1949-1950, then became the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1952. He was elected Secretary-General of the Arab League from 1952 to 1972. He passed away in 1992. For more information, see: Qasim Sadiq Mohyi, "Abdul Khaleq Hussouna and His Influence in the Arab League 1952-1972," unpublished Master's thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, Diyala University, 2018.

(7)Kimchee David, *The Afro-Asian movement: ideology and foreign policy of the Third World*, Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1973, p63; Azhar Abdul Rahman Abdul Karim and Noor Mohammed Hassan, "The Role of the People's Republic of China in the Bandung Conference and Its Impact on Its Relationship with Egypt 1955-1956," *Journal of the College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Dhi Qar*, 2017, P.4.

(8)Ahmad Sukarno (1901-1970) was an Indonesian politician born on the island of Java. He studied civil engineering at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1925 and completed his doctorate in the Netherlands. He advocated for independence from Dutch colonial rule and joined the Indonesian National Party, eventually becoming its leader. In 1933, he was exiled to Flores Island and later to Sumatra. He was released in 1942, and after the revolution and the declaration of Indonesian independence, he was elected President of the country in 1945, serving until 1968. Sukarno called for the Bandung Conference in 1955, which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement. He passed away in 1970. For more, see: Kifah Jumaa and Jar Rashid Al-Saedi, "Internal Political Developments in Indonesia 1945-1967," unpublished Master's thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2004; Mohammed Sadek Ismail, "The Indonesian Experience: Political Reform and the Separation of Powers," Arab Publishing and Distribution, Cairo, 2015.

(9) For more details about the Bandung Conference, see: Beter Bloom, *Meanings of Bandung: postcolonial orders and DE colonial visions*, Rowman, USA, 2016.

(10) Ressel H. Fifeld, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945-1958*, Harper & Brothers, NEW York, 1958, p477; Hamdi Abdul Rahman Hassan, "Israeli-African Relations in a Changing World," *Arab Affairs Journal*, Issue (107), September 2001, P.151.

(11) Sind Walid Said, "The Policy of Israeli Penetration in the Horn of Africa," *Journal of International Politics*, P.267.

(12) Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) was an Egyptian military officer and politician born in Alexandria. He studied at the "Nahasyeen" school and then joined the "Egyptian Youth Association" to protest against British colonialism. He enrolled in the Military Academy in 1937 and participated in the Palestine War in 1948. In 1952, he formed the founding committee of the Free Officers and successfully led a revolution to overthrow King Farouk, announcing the republic in 1953. He became Prime Minister in 1954 and then President of the Republic in 1956. He embraced the idea of constructing the Aswan High Dam and securing the Suez Canal in 1956, and announced the unification of Syria and Egypt, assuming the presidency of the United Arab Republic in 1958. He announced his resignation from power in 1967. For more, refer to: Buthaina Abdul Rahman Yasin Al-Tikriti, "Gamal Abdel Nasser: A Historical Study of the Emergence and Development of Nasserite Thought," unpublished Master's thesis, College of Arts, Baghdad University, 1998; F. A. Lutskivets, "Nasser and the Battle for Economic Independence 1952-1971," ed. Salwa Abu Saada, Dar Al-Kalima for Publishing, Beirut, 1980.

(13) Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1994, P:130; Kimchee David, *Op.Cit.*, P. 66.

(14) Haggai Erlich, *Op. Cit*, p: 131.

(15) Voice of the Arabs: It is an Egyptian radio station broadcasting from Cairo, established on July 4, 1953. It was one of the first and most famous Egyptian radio stations that aired to all parts of the Arab world in Arabic. The station gained fame as a primary medium used by the then Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to broadcast his speeches about Arab unity and opposition to foreign colonialism in Arab countries. Despite its prominence in the 1950s and 1960s, it has since struggled with a wide audience and significant popularity in Egypt and the Arab world in general. For more information, see: Abbas Metwally, "Voice of the Arabs: The Radio that Undermined the Foundations of Colonialism," Egyptian General Book Authority, Cairo, 2019, P.5-20.

(16) Akililu Habte was born in 1912 into a family of preachers in the Shoa region. He was one of the young individuals who supported Haile Selassie, and during his visit to Egypt in 1924, he was impressed by the new liberal education system in the country. He arranged to send several young people under his personal care to Egypt, where Akililu was sent to Alexandria in 1925. He attended the French Lycée for six years and during that time, he served as the head of about thirty young Ethiopian students in Alexandria.

He also took on the responsibility of introducing younger Ethiopian students who were educated by the Coptic Church. In 1943, Akililu was appointed as the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he was officially appointed to the position from 1947 until 1958. He assumed the role of Prime Minister in March 1961 and held this position until the revolution of 1974. Akililu was a key figure in the policies of Haile Selassie and served as his primary advisor on foreign affairs. In Akililu's vision of international relations, Egypt held a particularly prominent place, shaped by the stages of his personal development throughout his life. The six years he spent in Egypt had a lasting impact on him, and thanks to his fluency in Arabic and French, he formed numerous friendships with Egyptian people. His life came to a tragic end when he was executed in November 1974, along with other notable figures from Haile Selassie's regime. see:

(17) Haggai Erlich, op. cit, p210.

(18) Sami Sabri Abdul Qawi Said, "Ethiopian-Israeli Relations and Their Impact on Arab National Security 1961-1993," unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2016, P.40.

(19) Abdul Wahab Al-Kayyali, The Political Encyclopedia, Vol. 1, Arab Foundation for Studies and Publishing, Beirut, 1979, P.213.

(20) Haggai Erlich, Alliance and Alienation: Ethiopia and Israel in the Days of Haile Selassie, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv, 2014, p69.

(21) Ethiopia Will Grant Israel De Jure Recognition_ Develops Trade, (Jewish Telegraphic Agency), 29 June 1954; Eytan, Walter: The first ten years: a diplomatic history of Israel, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1958, p: 191.

(22) Ethiopia Extends De Facto Recognition to Israel Exchange Consuls, in (Jewish Telegraphic Agency), 6 June 1956.

(23) Ethiopia had a Consul General in Jerusalem before the establishment of Israel. Following the founding of the Hebrew state, Ethiopia requested accreditation for its Consul General from the Israeli government, and this accreditation was approved, as it was by Jordan, as well as for El Salvador. With the exception of these two consuls, the remaining consuls who served in Jerusalem since 1948 did not receive accreditation from either the Israeli or Jordanian governments. Consequently, they served informally and, therefore, were unable to perform official functions and duties that require recognition by the government or its agencies from either Israel or Jordan: Eytan, Walter: Op. Cit. p:85.

.P.29 Op.Cit.,)Sami Sabri Abdul Qawi Said²⁴(

(25) Aida Al-Ali, "Sudan and the Nile: Between the Hammer of Separation and the Anvil of Israeli Influence," Dar Al-Afaq Al-Jadid, Beirut, 1998, P.130.

(26) ארכיון מדינת ישראל: ראיון אצל הקיסרי באדיס אבבה אל מחלקת אסיה- אפריקה 18 אוקטובר 1956. Archive of the State of Israel: Meeting with the Emperor, Addis Ababa to the Asia-Africa Section, October 18, 1956.

(27) The continuation of violations by the Zionists of the Rhodes Treaty, signed in 1949, was among the precursors to the Tripartite Aggression. One of the most dangerous of these violations was the attack on Gaza in the evening of February 28, 1955, alongside Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the decision by Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, served as a pretext for Britain, France, and Israel to strike Egypt. A secret agreement was made among the three conspirators in Sevres, Paris. Israel's plan involved occupying Sinai and reaching the Suez Canal, using the justification of eliminating the fedayeen bases and addressing the threat posed by Egypt to Israeli navigation in the Suez Canal. For more details, see: Omar Faisal Mahmoud Al-Ghanem, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Political Historical Study," Tarous Center for Publishing and Distribution, Kuwait, 2019, PP.20-30.

²⁸(For more details about the Suez War, See: Bowie, Robert R, Suez 1956, Oxford University Press, New York, 1974.

(29) FO, 371/ 118784, Addis to African Department, September 6, 1956.

(30) Zach Levey, Israel's Strategy in Africa 1961-1967, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 36, No.1, Feb 2004, PP. 76-77.

(31) FO 371/ 125363, British Embassy, Khartoum to FO, January 9, 1957.

(32) Haggai Erlich, Alliance and Alienation, Op.Cit., p70.

(33) Mossad: It is an Israeli intelligence agency established on December 13, 1949, with Reuven Shiloah as its first director. Mossad is divided into three main divisions: the Collection Division, the Operations Division, and the Psychological Warfare Division. Its mission is to gather intelligence, manage foreign espionage networks across various countries, deploy agents, oversee and monitor publicly available information, track publications and newspapers worldwide, and provide an assessment of the political and economic situation, along with confidential proposals and recommendations regarding the steps that senior authorities should take. For more information, refer to: Mikhail Bar Rohan and Naseem Mishaal, "The Mossad: The Major Operations of the Israeli Intelligence Service," translated by Zina Idris, Vols. 1-2, Arab House for Publishers, Beirut, 2013; Abdul Qadir Shaheeb, "The Mossad: The Fall of the Legend," Egyptian General Book Authority, Cairo, 2002.

(34) Sami Sabri Abdul Qawi Said, Op.Cit., P.29.

(35) Benjamin Beth Halmi, The Israeli connection: Who is Israel arming and why, Pantheon Books, New York, 1987, p52.

(36) Isser Harel (1912-2003) was an Israeli politician born in Vitebsk, Russia. He immigrated to Palestine in 1930 and joined a Zionist youth organization that facilitated immigration to Palestine at the age of seventeen. He became the first director of Israel's internal security agency, Shin Bet, and chaired the Mossad one year after its establishment in 1951, serving as the head of the three intelligence agencies in Israel. He resigned in 1963 and was elected a member of the Knesset in 1969. He passed away in

2003. For more information, see: Yusuf Hassan Yusuf, "Blood on the Doors of the Mossad," Sama for Publishing and Distribution, n.p., 2016, P.119; Tarek Fawzi, "Israel: A State Created by Intelligence," Dar Al-Ahmadi, n.p., 2002, P.133.

(37) Haggai Erlich, Alliance and Alienation, Op.Cit., p: 68.

(38) Ibid, p:69 .

(39) Document 2, Chaim Gvaryahu to Knesset members Avraham Herzfeld and Michael Hazani, 13/5/1958, File PRES-10/10) p:40.

(40)Alteras Isaac, Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli relations, 1953-1960, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, US, 1993, p: 310.

(41) Alpher Joseph, Periphery: Israel's search for Middle East allies, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, U.S, 2015, p:15.

(42) Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) was a French military officer and politician born in Lille. He graduated from the Saint-Cyr Military Academy in 1912 and joined the infantry branch of the French armed forces to participate in battles of World War I, during which he was captured and held as a prisoner for two years by German forces. After his release, he was appointed deputy to the Head of the Supreme War Council. At the onset of World War II, he was assigned to the Fifth Army's tank units in 1939. De Gaulle wrote numerous military books and articles in which he criticized the French military establishment. In 1940, he was appointed as the Undersecretary of State for War and National Defense; however, he opposed the armistice with Germany and fled to London, where a military court sentenced him to death in absentia in August 1940. He formed a French government in exile with other dissenters, leading it starting in 1941. De Gaulle returned to France in August 1944 to become the head of the French provisional government until 1946. He returned to power in 1958 and resigned in 1969. He passed away in 1970. For more details, refer to: Zainab Abbas Hassan Al-Tamimi, "French-American Political Relations during the Era of Charles de Gaulle 1958-1969," unpublished Doctoral dissertation, College of Arts, University of Basra, 2014; Khalil Hanna Tadros, "Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle," 2nd edition, Al-Jazeera Library, Cairo, 2016.

(43) Alteras Isaac, Op.Cit., p311; Haggai Erlich, Alliance and Alienation, Op.Cit., p: 71.

(44) Alpher Joseph, Op.Cit., p: 10.

(45)Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was an Iranian political figure born in Tehran, the elder son of Iran's Shah, Reza Pahlavi. In 1935, he studied at the Military Academy in Iran. Following the abdication of his father in 1941 due to the pressures exerted by the Allied forces during World War II, he ascended to the throne as the ruler of Iran. His reign was marked by political unrest and conflicts, particularly with Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, which culminated in his initial exile from Iran in 1953. However, he made a comeback after orchestrating a counter-coup, resulting in the ousting of Mossadegh and the restoration of his monarchy.In 1963, he initiated his reform program known as the "White Revolution," which aimed to modernize and westernize Iran's economy and

society. However, his increasingly oppressive policies to quell internal dissent led to the rise of widespread public support for Ayatollah Khomeini. This discontent ultimately contributed to the Iranian Revolution in 1978, which forced Pahlavi to flee Iran. He remained in exile until his death in Egypt in 1980. For more information, see:

Abdul Rasool Shaheed Ajami and Haidar Ali Khalaf Al-Akeeli, "The Shah and Oil: A Study on the Oil Policies of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi," Dar Tamouz Demouzi, 2019.

(46) Alpher Joseph, Op.Cit., p:3_7.

(47) Ali Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) was a Turkish politician born in Aydın. He studied law at Ankara University and was elected as a member of parliament for the Republican People's Party in 1945. In 1946, he co-founded the opposition Democracy Party with other members. After his party participated in the elections, he was elected to lead the Turkish government. However, he was removed from power in a military coup in 1960, arrested, and executed by hanging in 1961. For further information, see: Asmaa Abdul Kareem Matar Al-Mafraji, "Adnan Menderes and His Political Role in Turkey 1945-1961," unpublished Master's thesis, College of Education for Women, Tikrit University, 2015; Farid Salah Al-Hashimi, "Turkey in Light of the Facts," Dar Al-Ibr, Istanbul, 2014, P.36.

(48) Black Ian, srael's secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services, Grove Press, New York, 1992, p: 187.

(49) The Trident Alliance lasted for more than twenty years, until the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979. Israel's strategic relationship with Turkey continued intermittently for several decades thereafter and has ended, at least for the time being, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan turned against Turkey.

(50) Alpher Joseph, Op.Cit., p: 15_18.

(51) Ibid., p:24.

(52) Document 2, Chaim Gvaryahu to Knesset members Avraham Herzfeld and Michael Hazani, 13/5/1958, File PRES-10/10) p:41.

(53) Mengistu Newy: A military officer and politician born in Addis Ababa, he entered the Holota Military Academy. After the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War, Mengistu went into exile in Sudan, where he received military training at the Subaru Academy (1940-1941). He also worked as a secondary expert with Commonwealth forces. He returned to Ethiopia with a group of nationalist youths and, in a very short time, became one of Emperor Haile Selassie's closest associates. In 1951, he pressured for a rebellion against the emperor. Subsequently, Mengistu served as the commander of a battalion during the Korean War. By 1955, he became the commander of the Imperial Guard, and on October 3, 1956, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. For more, see: David h.shinn. Thomas p, of can sky, historical of Ethiopia scarecrow oxford ,2004, p:282 ;David h.shinn. Thomas p, of can sky, historical of Ethiopia scarecrow oxford ,2004, p:282

- (54) Sami Sabri Abdul Qawi Said, Op.Cit., P.
(55) Haggai Erlich, Alliance and Alienation, Op.Cit., p: 80.
(56) Ben-Gurion Archive, Item, 85969, November 24, 1960.
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