

The Course of Syrian-Saudi Political Relations (1993-1994)

Prof. Dr. Saleh Ja'iyoul Jowaid Al-Sarray¹, Ms. Roaa Waheed Abdul-Hussein Al-Saadawi²

¹Email: Saleh.j.alsaraiy@utq.edu.iq

²Email: dr.rawaa.wahid.hussein@utq.edu.iq

^{1,2}University of Thi Qar - College of Education for Human Sciences / Department of History

Abstract

Following the conclusion of the Second Gulf War, Syria aimed to forge security arrangements with Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to ensure mutual security and stability, as well as to deter potential provocations from other parties. In pursuit of this objective, Damascus intensified its diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia as part of a broader strategy to navigate regional challenges. Discussions between the two nations concentrated on evaluating the evolving peace process in the Middle East and addressing the ongoing crisis, with a particular focus on achieving a just and comprehensive resolution to the Palestinian issue and the Arab-(Israeli) conflict. This included demands for the total withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories. Nevertheless, the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was perceived by Syria as a significant concession regarding Arab positions on the Palestinian cause, which it believed undermined UN resolutions advocating for land-for-peace exchanges—a principle that had guided negotiations involving Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. Despite these differing perspectives, Saudi Arabia supported the agreement as a pathway to peace. The bilateral relationship between Syria and Saudi Arabia, marked by cooperation on various issues, gradually evolved. They collaborated to articulate a unified response to regional developments and bolstered the Arab League's role in Arab decision-making. The culmination of this collaboration was evident in the tripartite summit held in Alexandria on December 28, 1994, where Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt coordinated their stances against (Israeli) encroachments and worked to enhance Arab solidarity, thereby reinforcing Syria and Saudi Arabia's commitment to resolving Arab conflicts and improving regional relations.

Keywords: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Palestinian Issue, Arab Cooperation, Yemen

Introduction

The importance of studying Syrian-Saudi political relations during the period of 1993-1994 lies in the fact that both countries play a prominent role in the regional landscape and hold significant influence in the Middle East. The significance of Saudi Arabia is attributed to key factors; it possesses the largest oil reserves in the world and has a unique strategic location that affects global oil transit routes. Furthermore, it adopts a foreign policy centered on balance and the protection of Gulf security. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has maintained strong relations with Syria, recognizing that Syria is one of the pillars upon which the Arab regional system is based.

These relations witnessed collaboration and coordination regarding the peace process in the Middle East, exploring the latest developments in the crisis, and working towards a fair and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue and the

Arab-(Israeli) conflict, as well as achieving the complete withdrawal of (Israeli) forces from all occupied Arab territories.

The nature of the study necessitated dividing it into three main axes, along with an introduction and a conclusion. The first axis is titled "Syrian-Saudi Relations Regarding the Palestinian-(Israeli) Agreement of 1993," while the second axis covers the Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian Tripartite Summit of 1994.

1- Syrian-Saudi Relations Regarding the Palestinian (Israeli) Agreement of 1993

Syria adopted a more steadfast position with the Palestinian Liberation Organization following the organization's participation in multilateral talks with Israel held on January 28, 1992, which Damascus boycotted. In this context, Syria insisted on the removal of (Israeli) settlements from the West Bank and Gaza, the annexation of East Jerusalem to the Palestinian state, and granting the right of return to Palestinian refugees. Additionally, Syria provided support and assistance to Palestinian organizations opposed to the peace process, despite Yasser Arafat's criticism of the Syrian support for them. All these steps served as a motivation for the organization to reach an agreement with (Israel) without Syria's knowledge .(1) .

During the time when (Israel) was exchanging negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization regarding the commitment to reach an agreement, Damascus received U.S. Secretary of State (Warren Christopher)(2) on October 25, 1993. He carried a message to President Assad that included Rabin's approval for a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights, which marked the first (Israeli) acknowledgment since the June 1967 war⁽³⁾ . (Israel), by calling for peace, sought to draw Syria into accepting its terms, which included a partial withdrawal from the Golan and separating the Golan and Syrian issue from the Palestinian-(Israeli) settlement⁽⁴⁾ . However, the(Israeli)-Syrian negotiations stalled due to President Hafez al-Assad's rejection of (Israel's) conditions, specifically its failure to commit to a complete withdrawal from the Golan. Rabin's response was that if an agreement with Syria were reached, the agreement with the Palestinians would be limited to Gaza. However, this progress proved to be elusive, and Rabin gave the green light to finalize the Oslo Accords⁽⁵⁾ .

Accordingly, an agreement was reached between (Israel) and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was manifested in the Declaration of Principles regarding the temporary arrangements for self-governance⁽⁶⁾ , signed in Washington and known as the Oslo Accords⁽⁷⁾ , under the supervision of President Clinton. Mutual recognition was exchanged between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and this can be viewed as a step toward peace. However, it simultaneously represents a breach in the united Arab front, which aims for a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-(Israeli) conflict. This development was met with rejection from a segment of the Palestinian camp and among Arabs concerned with the peace process. ⁽⁸⁾

The President Hafez al-Assad expressed his rejection of the Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement by stating: "**Syria stands by its principles and any agreement that does not contradict itself firstly and does not conflict with other pathways secondly. We are not satisfied with the agreement and will not support it, but we will not oppose it.**"⁽⁹⁾ Furthermore, Syria warned that the Oslo Agreement does not constitute an achievement or progress towards peace, as it does not stem from the resolutions of international legitimacy, the Security Council, and the principles of land for peace.⁽¹⁰⁾

It is noteworthy that Syria viewed the Oslo Accords as a concession to the Arab constants concerning the resolution of the foremost Arab issue, which is the Palestinian cause. Additionally, Syria regarded it as a decision that is unrelated to United Nations resolutions, particularly Resolutions(242) and (338), which are based on the principle of land for peace—a principle for which Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon engaged in negotiations and coordinated their efforts⁽¹¹⁾. This development complicated Syria's relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and subsequently affected Syria's relations with Jordan⁽¹²⁾.

The positions of Arab countries regarding the 1993 Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement varied. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supported it and announced its approval of the signing of the Declaration of Principles Agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, considering it a first step toward achieving a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue and the Arab- (Israeli) conflict, based on UN Security Council Resolutions(242 and 338), the principle of land for peace, and the complete (Israeli)withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories⁽¹³⁾. Saudi Arabia accepted the Oslo Accords and continued to support the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people, providing financial assistance to the government to manage state affairs.⁽¹⁴⁾.

In light of the differing stance of Riyadh towards Syria, the latter has directed numerous criticisms towards the Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement, viewing it as a significant capitulation on the part of the Palestinian organization for accepting (Israeli) conditions. According to the Syrian government, the agreement has placed Syria in a relatively difficult position⁽¹⁵⁾ amid subsequent American pressures to reach a Syrian-(Israeli) agreement concerning the Golan Heights, under terms that guarantee (Israeli) security while returning the demilitarized Golan Heights to Syria⁽¹⁶⁾. This is particularly significant as Syria has been following a strategy of maneuvering by insisting on achieving parallel progress in the Palestinian and Lebanese negotiations as a precondition for signing any agreement, in order to leverage this in improving the terms of the settlement regarding the Golan Heights⁽¹⁷⁾.

Despite the differing positions between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Syria regarding the Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement, relations have witnessed cooperation and coordination on many issues, as well as ongoing consultations regarding the peace process in the Middle East, which is the central issue for the Arab world and around which political activity between the two countries revolves, particularly concerning the Syrian-(Israeli) aspect and the principles of peace⁽¹⁸⁾. There has been

alignment in viewpoints between Riyadh and Damascus regarding the conditions for a regional solution to the Arab-(Israeli) conflict, and Syria has needed Saudi Arabia in its demands for comprehensive peace and its support. The nature of Arab activity has focused on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during this period, while the Saudi role has become the focal point of polarization in the post-Oslo Agreement phase, a stage in which the United States has sought to achieve a declaration of principles agreement between Syria and Israel.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has placed its international diplomatic weight and regional political influence in support of the Syrian position regarding any agreement between Syria and Israel. It has called for the settlement with Israel to be based on the principle of complete withdrawal in exchange for the land-for-peace resolution that was agreed upon at the Madrid Conference, which formed an Arab-accepted basis for direct negotiations between Arab countries and Israel.⁽¹⁹⁾

The American administration has sought to achieve a breakthrough in the Syrian-(Israeli) track similar to the breakthrough it achieved in the Palestinian- (Israeli) track. In this context, Syria viewed the Palestinian negotiations as a departure from the supposed Arab coordination in peace talks and did not support it, while Riyadh endorsed it, considering it a step towards a just and comprehensive peace. This is despite Washington's ambitions that Riyadh would exert its efforts and influence to pressure the Syrian government into adopting flexibility regarding the proposed Syrian-(Israeli) principles. The goal was to initiate low-profile negotiations with Israel, akin to the Palestinian-(Israeli) negotiations. In this sense, the message is Saudi to Syria⁽²⁰⁾.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wanted to clarify to the American administration that any Saudi efforts on this matter are governed by a clear and specific ceiling regarding peace. These are not merely Syrian principles but also represent fundamental Saudi positions that cannot be overlooked. This means that Saudi Arabia stands beside Syria in its demands and negotiations with Israel. Thus, the coordination and Saudi objective serve as a foundation aimed at a unified goal: to strengthen Syria's negotiating position regarding the principles of the shared declaration with Israel, supported by a strong Saudi stance. At the same time, it delineates for Washington the upper limits of how far the desired Saudi endeavor can go in softening Damascus's position on this issue⁽²¹⁾.

Although Syria's reservations and Saudi Arabia's support appear to reflect differing positions, political sources in Riyadh have expressed their belief that they understand Syria's concerns regarding the Palestinian (Israeli) agreement. This understanding stems from Syria's desire to achieve comprehensive peace for all Arab parties involved in the peace process. The Syrian ambassador to Riyadh, Omar al- Sayed, stated that Syria's commitment to establishing a comprehensive and just peace for the Arab (Israeli) conflict entails the complete withdrawal of all occupied Arab territories, in accordance with international legitimacy and especially Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Thus, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has

appreciated Syria's rejection of the Palestinian-Syrian agreement and has supported its decisions regarding peace⁽²²⁾.

Given the discussions held between Syria and Saudi Arabia regarding the peace process and the merits of the (Israeli)-Palestinian agreement, the joint Saudi-Syrian committee meetings were held on⁽²³⁾ October 19, 1993, chaired by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa. The political talks between the two countries addressed the developments of the peace process in the Middle East. The committee commenced its work with an opening statement by Farouk Sharaa, who stated, "Peace and occupation cannot coexist, and Syria supports true, just, and comprehensive peace that the Arab nation aspires to, which preserves its dignity, restores its occupied lands, and achieves stability and prosperity for the entire region." He emphasized that Syria is opposed to a fake peace built on occupied territories and usurped rights, as such a peace will not endure and cannot achieve security, prosperity, or stability for anyone. The Foreign Minister stressed Syria and Saudi Arabia's commitment to the principles and foundations of the Madrid Peace Conference for implementing UN Security Council resolutions that obligate (Israel) to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, particularly from Jerusalem, the entirety of the Syrian Golan, and southern Lebanon⁽²⁴⁾. He confirmed that the Syrian and Saudi joint positions would not have reached this high level of convergence without the close cooperation established through the wisdom and faith of President Hafez Al-Assad and King Fahd bin Abdulaziz⁽²⁵⁾.

A joint press release was issued by the two countries at the conclusion of the joint committee's work, addressing the common principles that both countries deem essential and unchanging for the establishment of peace. These principles include the complete (Israeli) withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories based on international legitimacy⁽²⁶⁾, particularly United Nations Security Council resolutions (242, 338, and 425), and the principle of land for peace along with the guarantee of Palestinian rights⁽²⁷⁾. These principles are the cornerstones guiding the Saudi and Syrian policies regarding peace between the Arabs and (Israel). The statement expressed satisfaction with the level of interaction, coordination, and consultation between Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the political sphere at all levels. The two ministers agreed to intensify consultation and coordination between them in the upcoming stage⁽²⁸⁾.

Before leaving Riyadh after the conclusion of the committee's work, Farouk al-Sharaa met with Prince Abdullah, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Their discussion revolved around the current Arab situation, the Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement, Syrian-Saudi relations, the committee's discussions, and Syria's stance on the Oslo Agreement. Prince Abdullah expressed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's appreciation for Syria's position on peace and reaffirmed the Kingdom's steadfast support for Syria. He conveyed his high regard for President Hafez al-Assad's positions in achieving a just and comprehensive peace based on the return of all occupied Arab territories, particularly the entirety of the occupied Syrian Golan. He

emphasized that there can be no peace in the region without Syria and that the Arabs stand with Syria more than ever⁽²⁹⁾.

In line with the ongoing discussions and consultations between the two countries regarding peace and the region, President Hafez Al-Assad received a message from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz through his Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, on June 17, 1994. This message addressed the peace negotiations and their implications for the Arab world. The conversation included the situation in the region, the challenges faced by Arab countries, and the means to address these challenges from the perspective of the common Arab interest. Saud Al-Faisal indicated that King Fahd's message contained two essential aspects: the bilateral relations between the two countries and the ongoing consultations about these relations. He further emphasized that the discussions between the Syrian and Saudi leaderships continue to be important for his country, noting that President Hafez Al-Assad must be kept informed about all matters of mutual interest between the two countries at all stages⁽³⁰⁾.

In light of this, Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, visited Damascus on September 9, 1994, and met with President Hafez al-Assad in the presence of his deputy, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and a number of senior officials. The discussions between them covered a range of Arab, regional, and international issues of mutual interest in a comprehensive manner, foremost among which were the peace negotiations and the status of American efforts in its talks with Damascus regarding the continuation of Syrian-(Israeli) negotiations. The Syrian president presented what had been achieved in this regard and the process of advancing the settlement path between Syria and Israel, which had been prepared during his meeting in Geneva with President Bill Clinton, while also noting Israel's attempts to obstruct the peace process⁽³¹⁾.

The Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement has led to an increase in the ties between Syria and Saudi Arabia, as both countries cling to a unified peace framework that calls for a just and comprehensive peace across all tracks. They emphasize adherence to United Nations resolutions and reject partial agreements with one party without the other. Furthermore, there has been an increase in communications and discussions between the two countries regarding the Syrian-(Israeli) negotiations, highlighting Saudi Arabia's support for Syria in its demands and endorsement of a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Additionally, one of the repercussions of the (Israeli)-Palestinian agreement known as the Oslo Accords was Syria and Saudi Arabia's participation in a trilateral summit with Egypt in Cairo. This marked the beginning of an Arab awakening, underscoring the importance of ensuring the continuation of the peace process. The summit was an attempt by Riyadh, Damascus, and Cairo to improve the conditions of the (Israeli)-Palestinian agreement.

2- The Tripartite Summit of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in 1994

Following the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians in 1993 and the Wadi Araba⁽³²⁾ Agreement with the Jordanians, Syria lost two fundamental cards in its confrontation with Israel⁽³³⁾. The Jordanian decision to sign the Wadi Araba Agreement with Israel in October 1994, without considering the other Arab negotiation tracks, effectively distanced Jordan from the Arab-(Israeli) conflict and removed it from the circle of frontline states confronting Israel. This prompted Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to adopt a hardline stance towards Jordan in the aftermath of the treaty, leading to the severance of diplomatic relations between Syria and Jordan⁽³⁴⁾.

In addition, active communications took place between several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Israel, notably highlighted by (Israeli) Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's visit to Oman in April 1994, as well as the arrival of an (Israeli) delegation in Qatar the same year to sign several economic agreements⁽³⁵⁾.

Accompanying these developments was U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit to Damascus on October 27, 1994, aimed at advancing the negotiation process⁽³⁶⁾ between Syria and Israel. During this visit, President Assad emphasized Yitzhak Rabin's commitment to the withdrawal to the borders established on June 4, 1967⁽³⁷⁾. In a gesture of goodwill towards the American president's arrival, Assad made significant concessions, agreeing to grant a 16-month timeframe for the (Israeli) withdrawal from the Golan Heights instead of the previously discussed 12 months. Furthermore, he proposed that prior to the full withdrawal from the Golan, there should be some form of diplomatic representation between Syria and Israel four months before the complete exit. President Clinton welcomed this development and invited both parties to the negotiating table again from November 2-3, 1994, potentially culminating in a meeting between Assad and Yitzhak Rabin⁽³⁸⁾.

The Syrian president feared the marginalization and isolation of Syria, especially after the separation of the Palestinian and Jordanian tracks from the Syrian-Lebanese track. This concern was further heightened by the (Israeli) intrusions or interventions in the Arab region, particularly following the proposal by (Israel) to hold the first Middle Eastern market conference in Casablanca, Morocco, during its attendance at the Economic Summit for the Middle East and North Africa on October 31, 1994. This conference represented the first bold attempt to normalize relations between Arabs and (Israel), with the latter aiming to expand its relationships with Arab and regional countries⁽³⁹⁾in order to weaken the position of the Syrian government and compel it to succumb to its demands in the upcoming negotiations⁽⁴⁰⁾.

In light of these developments, President Hafez al-Assad received Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the al-Rawda Palace in Damascus on November 9, 1994. The meeting was attended by Farouk al-Sharaa and the Saudi ambassador in Damascus. During this meeting, the Saudi Foreign Minister delivered a message from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz to President Assad, which was part of the coordination between the two countries to confront Israel. The discussion between them revolved

around the peace process and its developments across various fronts, as well as the overall Arab situation. They also addressed issues of mutual concern to both Syria and Saudi Arabia. Before leaving Damascus, Saud al-Faisal made a statement to a representative of the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), affirming that there is ongoing consultation between Saudi Arabia and Syria regarding developments in the Arab region. He indicated that Syria and Saudi Arabia are in the same trench and that they are one party in the peace process that concerns all Arabs, asserting that their views align on all matters discussed⁽⁴¹⁾.

In line with the Syrian steps in the peace process, Saud Al-Faisal traveled to Damascus on November 17, 1994, and met with President Hafez Al-Assad, at a time when Riyadh was conducting important and extensive communications with Washington aimed at the necessity of a change in the (Israeli) stance towards responding to the foundations of the Syrian policy concerning the peace process. In this context, Saud Al-Faisal's visit serves as an indication of Saudi Arabia's commitment to reaffirming its support for the Syrian position calling for Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon in exchange for peace with it. There is no doubt that this strengthened Damascus's position in its upcoming negotiations with the (Israelis), which are now poised to commence⁽⁴²⁾.

The timing of Prince Saud Al-Faisal's visit to Damascus occurred at a critical juncture between the anticipated arrival of U.S. Secretary of State Christopher to the Middle East. This was a central theme of the Saudi prince's mission for consultation and coordination with Damascus. Additionally, the visit aimed at organizing and arranging documents and coordinating positions among the Arab capitals that would be directly involved⁽⁴³⁾ or indirectly impacted. Moreover, discussions revolved around what ideas and proposals the U.S. Secretary might bring regarding the Syrian- (Israeli) negotiation framework. This visit was significant for aligning positions and creating the appropriate atmosphere before Christopher's arrival in Damascus concerning the Syrian-(Israeli) negotiations⁽⁴⁴⁾.

The arrival of Syria at a confrontation with Israel presupposed a maximum level of solidarity and cooperation between Syria and Saudi Arabia, which would mitigate the negative effects on Syria's negotiating position following the withdrawal of the Jordanian and Palestinian parties. It would also secure for both Syria and Lebanon a political depth that would fortify them against the (Israeli) singularity that arose from the neutralization of Amman and Gaza, as each became preoccupied with the detailed affairs related to the implementation stages of their peace with (Israel)⁽⁴⁵⁾. Regardless of whether Saudi Arabia was of interest on the agenda of visits by U.S. Secretary of State Christopher or not, it represents the cornerstone of the Arab political depth that Syria needs. Its position and role in the upcoming round of negotiations with Israel will be a strong support for Syrian-Lebanese negotiations in the face of any pressures they may face from the U.S. sponsor⁽⁴⁶⁾. Furthermore, while Riyadh was not directly concerned with the peace negotiations, it was fundamentally interested in peace itself, particularly in the Syrian concept of peace that aligns with the Saudi view, which advocates for a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace that responds to constants and

is based on the rules and conditions that have necessitated the Kingdom and its leadership's support, adoption, encouragement, and promotion of the peace process, as well as persuading Damascus to engage on the basis of returning occupied Arab territories to their rightful owners and (Israeli) withdrawal from them, ensuring Palestinians obtain their legitimate rights, and restoring East Jerusalem to Palestinian guardianship both in its religious and worldly aspects. This alignment of concepts has placed Syria and Saudi Arabia in the same trench of peace. Together, Syria and Saudi Arabia will face the upcoming round of Secretary Christopher's negotiations and engage in the challenging battle for peace on the Syrian-(Israeli) front with aligned positions⁽⁴⁷⁾.

As a result, Hafez Al-Assad could not bear the idea of Jordan making a sovereign decision to establish peace with Israel. The Syrian leadership considered the agreement to be more dangerous than any treaty ever signed with Israel, viewing it as a significant concession to the (Israeli) side. Following the conclusion of this agreement, Egyptian President Mubarak visited Damascus on December 1, 1994, where intensive discussions took place between the two presidents to calm the situation between Syria and Jordan and to discuss efforts to advance the peace process along the Syrian-(Israeli) and Lebanese-(Israeli) tracks⁽⁴⁸⁾. At the end of the visit, President Mubarak stated, "Egypt will continue to support the return of Syria's just rights; this is a principled issue that has not changed and will never change⁽⁴⁹⁾."

Given Israel's attempts to besiege Syria, the latter turned toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, seeking to establish a relationship with these two countries and create an Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi axis to bolster its negotiating position against Israel, while maintaining its relations with Iran and opening up to Iraq. These developments paved the way for the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi tripartite summit⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Consequently, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia began cooperating with each other to seek a unified stance in confronting events in the Middle East, supporting the Arab League, and establishing it as the primary Arab decision-making body⁽⁵¹⁾. Based on this understanding, the three countries believed that it was essential to prepare and establish a common ground before considering holding an Arab summit, to prevent such a summit from becoming a platform for exchanging attacks and exacerbating division and fragmentation among Arab parties. Therefore, President Hafez al-Assad headed to Cairo to meet with the Egyptian president for a closed meeting in preparation for the tripartite summit, which would include Riyadh. During this meeting, the Syrian president expressed his dissatisfaction with Arab countries improving their relations with Israel and entering into agreements with it individually, without considering other Arab rights⁽⁵²⁾.

Based on this, the tripartite summit (Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian) was held on December 28, 1994, in Alexandria after a rapid preparation. During this summit, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, and President Hafez al-Assad⁽⁵³⁾met, and the foreign ministers of the three countries joined them, each accompanied by a high-level delegation. The aim was to outline the general

frameworks of what would be agreed upon at the summit and to translate these into directions and initiatives for arranging the Arab situation in the coming phase among the three countries, based on a disciplined Arab vision of the nature of the challenges and methods of confrontation⁽⁵⁴⁾.

The leaders of the three countries reviewed their relations within the summit in an atmosphere of brotherhood and mutual trust, highlighting the distinguished ties among them in various political, economic, and cultural fields. They affirmed their determination to develop and enhance these relations within a framework of economic cooperation aimed at expanding and strengthening fruitful collaboration among their countries in the areas of trade, investment, and development, thereby serving their common interests⁽⁵⁵⁾. The three leaders agreed on the importance of reinforcing the role of the Arab League and its institutions, ensuring that it remains the central Arab organization that channels all aspects of Arab work in alignment with the noble objectives enshrined in the League's charter⁽⁵⁶⁾.

The trilateral summit is described as an ambitious attempt to revive Arab determination and is seen as a vital and effective nucleus for reinvigorating the spirit of joint Arab action. It represents a serious move among Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to purify the Arab atmosphere following the abandonment of interest in a unified Arab stance, the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel, and the shift towards individual agreements⁽⁵⁷⁾.

During the discussions, the three countries continued to affirm the victory of the Palestinian cause. King Fahd bin Abdulaziz stated that the Palestinian people must attain their national rights and exercise their right to self-determination⁽⁵⁸⁾. Driven by the three countries' commitment to achieving a just and comprehensive peace in the region as a strategic option, and their sincere efforts to remove the obstacles that impeded the peace process, they emphasized that this peace should be built on the resolutions of the Security Council (242 and 338) and the principle of land for peace⁽⁵⁹⁾. In this context, the Egyptian president and the Saudi king appreciated Syria's position and its serious efforts to ensure the success of the peace process⁽⁶⁰⁾, and they reaffirmed their steadfast support for Syria's just demands⁽⁶¹⁾. Furthermore, the leaders reiterated their calls for the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line, southern Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem⁽⁶²⁾.

The final report on the topics discussed at the tripartite summit was prepared⁽⁶³⁾, in addition to these demands and what the discussions encompassed. However, it agreed on a number of key principles established by Syria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Egypt on December 28, 1994, and committed to achieving them and considering their significance, which was of great importance⁽⁶⁴⁾.

On the second day of the summit, on December 29, 1994, President Hafez al- Assad and President Hosni Mubarak held a meeting at the Montazah Palace and then proceeded to King Fahd's residence in Al-Mamoura, where the closing session of the

summit took place⁽⁶⁵⁾. This summit concluded with a statement in which the three leaders called for resolving Arab issues through peaceful means. The final statement of the summit, delivered by Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, asserted the support for the peace process from all its aspects, emphasizing that the peace process faces significant challenges⁽⁶⁶⁾ and that the path is not yet closed before it. He concluded his remarks by noting that the summit yielded positive outcomes, the most important of which was the supportive stance of Saudi Arabia and Egypt regarding Syria's role in the Arab (Israeli) negotiations⁽⁶⁷⁾. Furthermore, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia backed Syria's condemnation of the position taken by Oman in hosting the (Israeli) Prime Minister without informing the Arab states about this visit, as well as Syria's denunciation of Qatar's stance, which welcomed positive diplomatic relations with (Israel)⁽⁶⁸⁾.

Therefore, Syria wanted the Arab position to be unified⁽⁶⁹⁾, and Saudi Arabia's support for Syria and Egypt in the Arab (Israeli) negotiations was based on two reasons: first, to strengthen the Arab position, and second, the Kingdom's fear of (Israeli) dominance over its interests in the Gulf region due to Israel's expanding relations with Gulf countries⁽⁷⁰⁾.

It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia encouraged the formation of a tripartite axis involving Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt out of concern about (Israeli) control over the region and the gradual rapprochement of one Gulf state after another that established ties with Israel and signed agreements across various sectors. Thus, Syria was closer to Riyadh in an effort to join forces to counter the (Israeli) policy.

The summit witnessed the coordination of the Syrian, Saudi, and Egyptian positions to confront the (Israeli) intrusions that attempted to impose a new Middle Eastern order and establish economic relations with Arab countries. Additionally, it highlighted the cooperation between Damascus and Riyadh in creating a conducive atmosphere, promoting Arab solidarity, overcoming the current Arab situation, and building a certain level of trust among all Arab states⁽⁷¹⁾.

Thus, the tripartite summit that took place between Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt was a response to the Palestinian (Israeli) agreement of 1993 and the Wadi Araba Treaty of 1994, which Syria opposed. The tripartite summit represented a Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian cooperation aimed at achieving just and comprehensive peace, demanding the implementation of United Nations resolutions, and calling for the withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. It marked a significant victory for Syria, as it received support from both Egypt and Saudi Arabia in its demands for peace, and Saudi Arabia backed the Syrian track that is based on the common Syrian- Lebanese partnership.

Conclusion

The ties between Syria and Saudi Arabia strengthened during the period from 1993 to 1994, as both countries adhered to the unified peace framework that calls for

a just and comprehensive peace across all tracks. They committed to the decisions of the United Nations and rejected partial agreements with one party over another. Saudi Arabia stood by Syria in its demands and supported the complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In light of the (Israeli)-Palestinian agreement, Syria and Saudi Arabia participated in a trilateral summit with Egypt in Cairo, marking the beginning of an Arab awakening that is essential for ensuring the continuity of the peace process. This summit was an attempt by Riyadh, Damascus, and Cairo to improve the terms of the (Israeli)-Palestinian agreement. Additionally.

Endnotes

- (1) Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel from War to Peacemaking, tr. Lina Wahib, Dar Al-Jalil Publishing House, Amman, 1997, pp. 229-230.
- (2) Warren Miner Christopher was an American politician born in Scranton on October 27, 1925, of Norwegian descent. He completed his high school education in Hollywood and then attended the University of Redlands before transferring to the University of California. He served in the U.S. Navy Reserve in 1942, and in 1946, he studied law at Stanford University. In 1977, he served as Deputy Secretary of State under President Carter, and in 1992, he became Secretary of State, holding that position until 1997. He passed away on March 18, 2011. For more information, refer to: Warren Christopher, "Chances of a Lifetime," New York, 2001, pp. 9-20.
- (3) Farouk Al-Sharaa, The Lost Novel (Memoirs and Testimonies), Arab Center for Research and Studies, Beirut, 2015, p. 286.
- (4) Al-Baath Newspaper, Damascus, No. 9268, October 26, 1993.
- (5) Moshe Maoz, Op. cit., p. 229.
- (6) Lucien Peterlan, Wars and Peace in the Middle East, Hafez al-Assad and the Three Challenges: Lebanon, Palestine, and the Gulf, tr. Muhammad Arab, Tlass Publishing House, Damascus, 1997, p. 591.
- (7) Oslo Agreement: This is the agreement that was officially held on September 13, 1993, between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, known as the Declaration of Principles Agreement ((Israeli)-Palestinian), under the guarantee of the United States and Russia in Washington, D.C. The signing of the Oslo Agreement was one of the results of the Madrid Peace Conference between the PLO and Israel. It came as a surprise to Jordan, as there had been secret communications occurring between the two sides leading eventually to the signing of a peace accord between the Palestinian and (Israeli) sides. This situation prompted Jordan to expedite its agreement with Israel to enhance its negotiating position, fearing that the Oslo Agreement might have been reached at the expense of its national interests. The Oslo Agreement included the following:
 - A. The establishment of a transitional self-governing authority, elected by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both parties agreed that the time had come to end decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize each other's legitimate political rights, and work towards living together in peaceful coexistence with mutual dignity and security.
 - B. The five-year transitional period would commence upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.
 - C. Israel would continue to bear responsibility for defense against external threats as well as maintaining public security.A joint Palestinian-(Israeli) liaison committee would be formed to address issues requiring cooperation. For further details,

Hussein Shaaban, Washington from the role of sponsor to full partner, Middle East Affairs Journal, Vol. 3, Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation, No. 20, June 1993, p. 113; Ahmed Hisham Mohamed Ghanem, The American Role in Settling the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Origin of the Two-State System as a Model (1991-2003), Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, 2013, p. 12.

(8) Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, The Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and (Israel), The Peace of Illusions, Oslo, Before and After, Part 3, 8th ed., Dar Al-Shorouk Publishing, Cairo, 2004, p. 301; Lucien Peter Lane, Op. cit., p. 591.

(9) Ahmed Magdy Mansour Muhrab, Jordanian-Israeli relations and their impact on the Palestinian issue 1994-1999, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Al-Azhar University, Gaza, 2012, p. 62.

(10) Talal Naji, Leader Assad, Bright Pages from the History of Steadfastness, Publications of the Syrian General Authority, Damascus, 2021, p. 310.

(11) Qais Abdul Karim Abu Laila and others, The Rough Road: A Look at the Palestinian-(Israeli) Negotiations from Madrid to Oslo, Dar Al-Taqaddum Al-Arabi Company for Press, Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1997, p. 191.

(12) Rezan Muhammad Numan Al-Rimawi, Palestinian-Syrian Relations 1981-2006, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Graduate Studies, Birzeit University, 2009, p. 69.

(13) Al-Rai Newspaper, Amman, No. 9478, August 5, 1994; Yusra Mahdi Saleh, Saudi Foreign Policy and the Arab Region Since the End of the Cold War, Majd Lawi Publishing and Distribution House, Amman, 2012, pp. 312-313.

(14) Abdul Fattah Hassan Abu Alia and others, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Issue, Riyadh, 1999, p. 488.

(15) Marwa Shahid Faraj Al-Khazali, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and his role in the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1982-2005), Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Thi Qar, 2023, p. 180.

(16) Muhammad Hussein Heikal, The Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and (Israel), Book Three: Oslo and What Came Before and After It, 7th ed., Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 1996, p. 426.

(17) Abdul Khaliq Farouk, Illusions of Peace, Arab Civilizations Center for Media and Publishing, Cairo, 1994, p. 123.

(18) Syrian Ministry of Information, Al-Baath House, Documentation and Information Department, Saudi Arabia supports Syria's position on the Declaration of Principles, File No. 193, 10/26/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia Relations, 1\1\1\1\8.

(19) Al-Baath Newspaper, Damascus, No. 9269, October 27, 1992.

(20) Syrian Ministry of Information, Al-Baath House, Documentation and Information Department, Saudi Arabia supports Syria's position on the Declaration of Principles, File No. 193, 10/26/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\1\1\1\8.

(21) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9262, October 19, 1993.

(22) Syrian Ministry of Information, Al-Baath House, Documentation and Information Department, Saudi-Syrian talks in Riyadh, File No. 1199, 10/22/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\8.

(23) The meeting was attended by the Syrian side, including the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, Mohammad Al-Emadi, the Minister of Finance, Khaled Al-Muhaeni, and the Minister of Education, Mohammad Ghassan Al-Halabi. From the Saudi side, the attendees included the Minister of Finance and Economy, Mohammad Aba Al-Khail, and the Minister of Education, Abdulaziz Al-Khowaiter.

See: Al-Watan Newspaper, Damascus, No. 803, October 20, 1993.

(24) Syrian Ministry of Information, Documentation and Information Department, Al-Baath House, File No. 1199, Saudi-Syrian talks in Riyadh on 10/19/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\8.

(25) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9262, October 19, 1993.

(26) Al-Watan Newspaper, No. 803, October 20, 1993.

(27) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9269, October 27, 1993.

(28) Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Syria's adherence to the Madrid formula and the complete (Israeli) withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, File No. 9264, 10/20/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia - Relations, Code: 1\10\11\1\1\8.

(29) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9264, October 21, 1993.

(30) Tishreen Newspaper, Damascus, No. 5975, July 5, 1994

(31) Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Talks Between Al-Assad and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on Peace, File No. 6469, April 9, 1994, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1/10/11/8.

(32) The Wadi Araba Treaty: This is the treaty that was signed in Wadi Araba near Aqaba on October 26, 1994, to establish relations between the two countries. The treaty included 30 articles and was signed on the Jordanian side by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Majali, and on the (Israeli) side by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, under the auspices of the United States with the presence of King Hussein. The agreement was presented to the deputies and senators, and it was voted on after discussions, exchanges of words, and debates. It was ratified by King Hussein following its approval by the National Assembly. . refer to:
For more, see: Ahmad Naji Qamjah, The Jordanian-Israeli Agreement: Different Visions and Problems, International Politics Journal, Cairo, No. 119, January 1995, p. 159.

(33) The signing of the Oslo Agreement represented a blow to Syria's hopes for achieving a comprehensive solution, as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) entered into an agreement with Israel on its own. In this context, President Hafez al-Assad expressed Syria's stance on the Palestinian-(Israeli) agreement in a press interview on September 20, 1993, in Damascus, indicating that the agreement does not pose a danger to Syria, which has been on the path to a comprehensive solution for twenty years. He stated that had Syria been seeking a solution solely for the Golan Heights issue, it would have had opportunities, but it rejected everything that did not achieve a comprehensive solution. Assad asserted that Syria would not be willing to accept a partial solution, and he clarified that Syria neither opposes, blesses, nor supports the agreement, noting that although he had previously offered advice to Yasser Arafat and urged him to unite the people and citizens to prevent massacres, the situation remained unchanged. . refer to:
Journal of Palestine Studies, Arab Documents, No. 16, Fall 1993, p. 265.

(34) Hassan Makhour Bani, Syria and Egypt: A Study in the History of Political Relations 1990- 2000, Unpublished Master's Thesis, College of Education for Humanities - University of Thi Qar, 2021, p. 123.

(35) Mustafa Jabbar Jassim Al-Taie, Iranian-Saudi Relations (A Study of the Most Prominent Influential Factors and Issues), Unpublished Master's thesis, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 2005, p. 132.

(36) The reason for Syria's impetus to negotiate with Israel was rooted in President Hafez al-Assad's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1990. During this visit, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev conveyed to al-Assad that Syria needed to abandon the notion of strategic parity with Israel and that military power alone could not resolve the Arab-(Israeli) conflict. It became evident that the theory of strategic balance, long advocated by Syria, had its prospects altered due to shifts in Soviet strategy in the region, alongside changes in Syrian policy itself. In order to maintain its role in the region for the coming years, Damascus was compelled to seriously engage with the West, continue rapprochement with Egypt and the Gulf States, and participate in efforts for a peaceful resolution to the Arab-(Israeli) conflict in one way or another. At this juncture, Egypt played a significant role in persuading Syria to participate in the negotiation process, thus allowing Syria to appear as a defender of Arab rights, which in turn enhanced its weight in the region. Syria became central to the peace process, and its relations with the United States improved after the latter acknowledged Syria's pivotal role in the peace process and reiterated its commitment to implementing Resolution

242 across all negotiation tracks, as well as its recognition of the illegitimacy of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. This acknowledgment contributed to increasing Syria's willingness to engage in negotiations with Israel in the peace process. The first round of peace negotiations between Syria and Israel officially commenced after the Madrid Conference in October 1991, where negotiations took place between the Syrian and (Israeli) delegations and continued thereafter. refer to:

Henry Lawrence, Op. Cit., p. 525; Wahid Abdul Majeed, Settlement of the Arab (Israeli) Conflict after the Gulf Crisis, Strategic Notebooks Series, Issue 4, Center for Political and Strategic Research and Studies, Cairo, 1991, p. 7.

(37) Farouk Al-Sharaa, Op. Cit., p. 319.

(38) Radwan Ziada, The Near Peace, The Syrian (Israeli) Negotiations, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, p. 412.

(39) Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1990, Institute for Palestine Studies, p. 11; Al-Safir Newspaper, No. 7032, March 14, 1995.

(40) Hassan Makhour Bani, Op. Cit., p. 131; Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Talk of Politics, Egyptian Printing and Publishing Company, Cairo, 2000, p. 381.

(41) Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Leader Al-Assad received a letter from King Fahd and discussed the peace process and the general Arab situation with Al-Faisal, File No. 9578, 11/10/1994, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\8.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Riyadh, Damascus Shares its Trench in the Battle of Peace, File No. 1985, 11/18/1994, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\8.

(44) Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Syrian-Saudi Relations, File No. 245, 11/20/1993 Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1/10/11/1/8.

(45) Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Riyadh, Damascus shares its trench in the battle of peace, File No. 1985, 11/18/1994, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\8.

(46) Al-Hawadeth Newspaper, No. 245, November 20, 1994.

(47) Syrian Ministry of Information, Al-Baath House, Documentation and Information Department, Riyadh, Damascus participates in the battle of peace, File No. 1985, 11/18/1994; Al-Hawadeth newspaper, No. 245, October 20, 1994.

(48) The movement in negotiations between the Syrian side and Israel began with the efforts of the United States on April 4, 1994, when President Hafez al-Assad visited Cairo to meet with the Egyptian president. The discussions between them focused on coordinating positions before the resumption of Arab-(Israeli) negotiations in Washington, following a visit by an (Israeli) delegation to Damascus on March 9, 1994, using Egyptian passports and arriving via Cairo airport rather than by land through the Golan Heights. President Assad received them and affirmed that Syria desires serious peace that ensures Arab rights. He expressed that the (Israeli) Prime Minister is not sincere in negotiations for peace with Syria and that he seeks to undermine the unified Arab front by reaching individual agreements with our Arab partners, negotiating with each one separately. Furthermore, he is reluctant to negotiate with Syria because doing so would result in the loss of the Golan Heights, refer to:

Hassan Makhour Bani, Op. cit., p. 136.

(49) Quoted from: Mazen Yousef Al-Sabbagh, Meeting of Eagles (Damascus-Riyadh-Cairo-Intimate Relationship), 1997, Beirut, p. 380; Al-Ahram Newspaper, No. 39442, December 21, 1994

(50) Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire, Arab House of Sciences, Beirut, 2000, p. 103; Al-Safir Newspaper, No. 6966, December 22, 1994.

(51) Center for Arab Unity Studies, Diaries and Documents of Arab Unity, October 31, 1994, p. 259.

(52) Akram Nour El-Din Al-Satea, History and Documents of the Second Half of the Twentieth Century (1950-2000), Events, Media, Documents, Dar Al-Nafaa'is, Damascus, 2008, p. 678.

(53): Accompanying President Hafez al-Assad was an official delegation that included Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the Vice President, and Farouk al-Sharaa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Egyptian delegation in the summit discussions, alongside President Hosni Mubarak, included Amr Moussa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Safwat al-Sharif, the Minister of Information. The Saudi delegation was comprised of His Majesty King Fahd bin Abdulaziz and Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mazen Yousef Al-Sabbagh, Op. Cit., p. 380; Al-Ahram Newspaper, No. 39442, December 21, 1994.

(54) Ibrahim Al-Dayah, Op. Cit., p. 175; Hassan Makhour Bani, Op. Cit., p. 133.

(55) Al-Ahram Newspaper, NO. 36469, December 29, 1994.

(56) Mazen Yousef Al-Sabbagh, Op. Cit., p. 496.

(57) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9620, December 29, 1994.

(58) Marwa Shahid Faraj Al-Khazali, Op. Cit., p. 180.

(59) Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6121, December 28, 1994.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9620, December 29, 1994.

(62) Hashem Othman, Modern History of Syria During the Era of Hafez al-Assad (1971-2000), Riad Al-Rayyes Publishing, Beirut, 2014, pp. 335-337.

(63) Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6122, December 29, 1994.

(64) 1. Arab national security from the Gulf to the Arab confrontation states with Israel.

2. Emphasizing the strategic security of Syria, as well as Egypt, in light of the challenges posed by the rapid transformations on both regional and international levels.

3. Developing the role of the Arab League at the Arab, regional, and international levels to face the challenges of the new world order.

4. Supporting the Syrian-Lebanese axis within the framework of the peace process and implementing United Nations resolutions regarding the withdrawal from the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon, and the Arab Bekaa, while reaffirming the priority of the issue of Jerusalem, its Arab identity, and the rights of the Palestinian people.

5. Striving to establish an Arab political and economic bloc, centered around the Alexandria Summit countries: Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which may include other Arab countries. For more details, refer to:

Al-Ahram Newspaper, No. 36479, December 39, 1994.

(65) The statement issued at the conclusion of the summit, signed by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, includes the following:

A. The three leaders' determination to develop and generalize the distinguished relations among their countries within a framework of economic cooperation based on expanding fruitful collaboration and solidifying it in the fields of trade, investment, and development, in a way that serves their common interests and achieves prosperity for the nation.

B. The commitment to double efforts in implementing and developing existing agreements, enhancing the progress of joint Arab economic work, and giving economic activities their due role in serving these goals.

C. A call for Iraq to complete the step it took in recognizing Kuwait's independence and borders.

D. The three leaders reaffirmed their demand for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, especially nuclear weapons. One of the key points they emphasized during the summit is that Arab solidarity is the way to ward off colonial ambitions and achieve fair common Arab interests and improve the living standards for the majority, as well as to implement construction and reconstruction programs. For more details, refer to:

Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6142, 12/31/1994; Al-Kifah Al-Arabi Journal, No. 857, 1/2/1995; Hashem Othman, Op. Cit., pp. 336-337; Riad Ma'asas, The Summit of Arab Regimes... The

Summit of Contradictions, published research, Sunday, October 12, 2023. on the website:
<https://syrianugn/today.net/ar/opinion/573>

- (66) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9620, December 29, 1994.
- (67) Mazen Yousef Al-Sabbagh, Op. Cit., p. 395.
- (68) Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9620, December 29, 1994.
- (69) Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6142, December 31, 1994.
- (70) Hashem Othman, Op. Cit., p. 336; Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9621, December 30, 1994.
- (71) Arab League documents, Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi Tripartite Summit, Desert Fighter. on the website:

http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Monzzmat3/Demshek/ec03.doc_cvt.htm

List of sources

Published documents

First . Arab Unity Diaries and Documents

- 1. Arab Unity Studies Center, Arab Unity Diaries and Documents, October 31, 1994.
- 2. Arab Unity Studies Center, Arab Unity Diaries and Documents for the Year 1994, Document 13, 1995.

3. Arab Unity Studies Center, Arab Unity Diaries and Documents for the Year 1995, Beirut, 1996.

Second. Documents of the Arab League, the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi tripartite summit, Desert Fighter, on the website:

http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Monzzmat3/Demshek/sec03.doc_cvt.htm

Third. Documents of the Syrian Ministry of Information

- 1. Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Syria's adherence to the Madrid formula and the complete (Israeli) withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, File No. 9264, 10/20/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia - Relations, Code 1\10\11\1\1\8.
- 2. Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Talks Between Al-Assad and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on Peace, File No. 6469, 4/9/1994, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\1\8.
- 3. Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Riyadh, Damascus Participates in the Battle of Peace, File No. 1985, 11/18/1994, Code: 1\10\11\1\1\8.
- 4. Syrian Ministry of Information, Dar Al-Baath, Documentation and Information Department, Leader Al-Assad Receives a Letter from King Fahd and Discusses the Peace Process and the General Arab Situation with Al-Faisal, File No. 9578, Date: 11/10/1994, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\1\8.
- 5. Syrian Ministry of Information, Al-Baath House, Syrian-Saudi Relations, File No. 245, 11/20/1993, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Code: 1\10\11\1\8.

Fourth. Documents of the National Information Center, the text of the joint statement issued in both Riyadh and Sana'a to contain the tension on the borders between the two countries on 1/16/1995, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2/15/1995, a documentary file issued monthly by the Syrian National Information Center.

Masters and Doctorate Theses

- 1. Ahmed Magdy Mansour Muhrab, Jordanian (Israeli) relations and their impact on the Palestinian issue 1994-1999, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Al- Azhar University, Gaza, 2012.
- 3. Hassan Makhour Bani, Syria and Egypt: A Study in the History of Political Relations (1990-2000), Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Education for Humanities - University of Thi Qar, 2021.

4. Marwa Shahid Faraj Al-Khazali, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and his role in the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1982-2005), Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Thi Qar, 2023.
5. Marwa Shahid Faraj, Saudi Foreign Policy under the Ministry of Prince Saud Al-Faisal (1990-2003), Unpublished Master's Thesis, College of Education for Humanities, University of Thi Qar, 2018
6. Mustafa Jabbar Jassim Al-Taie, Iranian-Saudi Relations (A Study of the Most Prominent Influential Factors and Issues), Unpublished Master's thesis, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 2005.
8. Yousef Sami Farhan Hussein Al-Dulaimi, Political Developments in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1982-1995, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, College of Arts - University of Anbar, 2015.

Books

1. Abdul Fattah Hassan Abu Alia and others, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Issue, Riyadh, 1999.
2. Abdul Khaliq Farouk, Illusions of Peace, Arab Civilizations Center for Media and Publishing, Cairo, 1994.
3. Akram Nour El-Din Al-Satea, History and Documents of the Second Half of the Twentieth Century (1950-2000), Events, Media, Documents, Dar Al-Nafaa'es, Damascus, 2008.
4. Farouk Saeed, Iraqi Diplomacy in Light of American Hegemony over International Bodies and Organizations, Majdlawi Publishing House, Amman, 2004.
5. Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire, Arab House of Sciences, Beirut, 2000.
6. Hashem Othman, Modern History of Syria During the Era of Hafez al-Assad (1971-2000), Riad Al-Rayyes Publishing, Beirut, 2014.
7. Hassan Abu Talib, Yemeni Unity: Studies in the Process of Transition from Fragmentation to Unity, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut 1994.
8. Lucien Peterlan, Wars and Peace in the Middle East, Hafez al-Assad and the Three Challenges: Lebanon, Palestine, and the Gulf, tr. Muhammad Arab, Tlass Publishing House, Damascus, 1997.
9. Mazen Yousef Al-Sabbagh, Meeting of Eagles (Damascus-Riyadh-Cairo-Intimate Relationship), 1997, Beirut.
10. Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel from War to Peacemaking, tr. Lina Wahib, Dar Al-Jalil Publishing House, Amman, 1997.
11. Muhammad Ahmad Al-Ashlami, The Political History of the Modern State from Diaspora and Isolation to Unity and Openness 1838-2001, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 2002.
12. Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Talk of Politics, Egyptian Printing and Publishing Company, Cairo, 2000.
13. Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, The Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and (Israel), The Peace of Illusions, Oslo, Before and After, Part 3, 8th ed., Dar Al-Shorouk Publishing, Cairo, 2004.
14. Muhammad Hussein Heikal, The Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and (Israel), Book Three: Oslo and What Came Before and After It, 7th ed., Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 1996.
15. Qais Abdul Karim Abu Laila and others, The Rough Road (A Look at the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations from Madrid to Oslo), Dar Al-Taqaddum Al-Arabi Company for Printing and Publishing House, Beirut, 1997.
16. Riad Najib Al-Rais, Southern Winds of Yemen and its Role in the Arabian Peninsula 1990- 1997, 2nd ed., Riad Al-Rayyes Books and Publishing, 2021.
17. Yusra Mahdi Saleh, Saudi Foreign Policy and the Arab Region Since the End of the Cold War, Majd Lawi Publishing and Distribution House, Amman, 2012.

Newspapers

1. Al-Baath Newspaper, Damascus, No. 9262, October 19, 1993.
2. Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9264, October 21, 1993
3. Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9269, October 27, 1992.
4. Al-Baath Newspaper, No. 9268, October 26, 1993.
5. Al-Baath Newspaper, No 9620, December 29, 1994.
6. Tishreen Newspaper, Damascus, No. 5975, July 5, 1994
7. Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6121, December 28, 1994.
8. Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6122, December 29, 1994.
9. Tishreen Newspaper, No. 6142, December 31, 1994.
10. Al-Watan Newspaper, No. 803, October 20, 1993.
11. Al-Safir Newspaper, Beirut, No. 6966, December 22, 1994.
12. Al-Rai Newspaper, Amman, No. 9478, August 5, 1994.
13. Al-Ahram Newspaper, No. 39442, December 21, 1994.
14. Al-Ahram Newspaper, No. 36469, December 29, 1994.
15. Al-Hawadeth Newspaper, No. 245, November 20, 1994.

Books in English Language

- Warren Christopher, chances of a Life Time, New York, 2001,-