

The Empowerment Strategy for Indonesian Fishermen to be Willing and Financially Able to Go to Sea in Zone 711

Albert Barita Marulam Sihombing¹, Marsetio², Angel Damayanti³, Sari Wahyuni⁴, Hendra Manurung⁵

1. Doctoral Program, STIK-PTIK POLRI, Jakarta, Indonesia, E-mail: baritaalbert@gmail.com
2. Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia, E-mail: marsetio@idu.ac.id
3. Faculty of Social dan Political Sciences, Christian University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, E-mail: angel.damayanti@uki.ac.id
4. Faculty of Economy and Business, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, E-mail: sari.wahyuni@ui.ac.id
5. Faculty of Defence Strategy, Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia, E-mail: hendra.manurung@idu.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The issue of empowering Indonesian fishermen is a transnational issue in the Southeast Asia regions, and Zone 711 in particular. The fisheries management area of the Republic of Indonesia 711, known as WPPNRI 711, is a water area with abundant natural resources, including oil and gas wealth and fish barns. This research is aimed at finding out how cooperation patterns work in the Fisheries Management Area of the Republic of Indonesia, from now on referred to as WPP-NRI, which is a fisheries management area for fishing that includes inland waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, additional zones, and Indonesia's exclusive economic zone. This research utilizes a qualitative research method using a descriptive-qualitative approach. The method of data gathering was collected using documentation studies and literature studies through Indonesian official documents such as Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) and ASEAN as a regional international, and journal articles. Efforts to empower fishermen continuously in Indonesia, especially in the Fisheries Management Area Zone of the Republic of Indonesia (WPP-NRI) 711, are strategic decisions to optimize the local people's welfare and economic independence of coastal communities. This zone encompasses the waters of the Natuna Sea, North Natuna Sea, and Karimata Strait, which have significant fish resource potential. This research revealed and explained patterns of cooperation between KKP and ASEAN identifying the results, that many small fishermen live in poverty and face various challenges in going to sea of Zone 711. The challenges in fisheries activities are also changing weather due to uncertain seasons and increasingly distant fishing areas. Therefore, in facing these challenges, innovation, and creativity in strategic decision-making are needed by the related stakeholders to continue in providing additional economic value.

KEYWORDS: Fishermen, Exclusive Economic Zone, Strategy Empowerment, Zone 711, Economic Value

1. Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the areas that has great potential in terms of economy and geostrategy, where this area is the main route of world trade with abundant supply or reserves of natural resources in it. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia's position as an influential country in the region has the burden to be able to resolve the dispute, including in accelerating the preparation of the Code of Conduct which is expected to be a joint solution (Gasim, 2024, p. 59). However, in this action there are also several strategic interests owned by Indonesia related to territorial sovereignty rights. Thereafter, the idea of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) should be built through a strong and implementable concept in international political economy (Manurung, 2018, p. 147).

In 2016, Indonesian logistics costs account for 24.6 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), among the highest in the Southeast Asian region (Susanty, 2016). However, Indonesian government at that time still had to overcome the occasional problem of claiming lower prices by considering low-load factors or empty cargo ships returning to major ports, even though they should also be carrying goods from the eastern region.

The GMF is a strategy chosen by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), declared on October 20, 2014, consisting of 7 pillars which has been running for three years since Presidential Regulation Number 16 of 2017 concerning the Indonesian Maritime Policy mainly focuses on domestic pillars such as the Sea Highway. This policy did not last long when President Jokowi entered his second term to focus on the vision of Indonesia Maju, which emphasized more on Indonesia's position as a developing country (Yakti & Tsauro, 2021, p. 164). According to Manurung, this concept of GMF can be taken as a committed direction, basic rule and paradigm together with all stakeholders to position Indonesia as a core country and center of gravity of the world's maritime economy. There are three breakthroughs that the government can make, namely:

First, Global Level. Indonesia is able to become a core country of the world's maritime economy because of its strategic geographical location and the support of maritime natural resource wealth as a base sector, where the non-maritime base sector is a supporting part of the GMF that is able to influence the international system (geostrategic).

Second, Regional Level. Indonesian government needs to determine the centers of gravity of the maritime economy followed by determining sectors based on vital and strategic commodity goods and services in the dynamics of the international economy and regional trade (geoeconomics). Indonesia's GMF should be conditioned to support each other with China's maritime silk road.

Third, National Level. Indonesia's GMF must be able to build and empower the economy of coastal communities living continuously in border areas with neighboring countries and outermost islands. Indonesia as the largest archipelagic country

in the world must move towards political economic sovereignty in the Nusantara ocean's according to the mandate of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution (geopolitics).

Furthermore, Indonesia foreign policy decision-makers highlight national strategic interests into three aspects in supporting to resolve the conflict, i.e.:


- 1) Defense. Indonesia perceives the conflict that occurs will have a negative impact on maritime security and sovereignty;
- 2) Economy. Through this conflict, trade, investment, and resource exploration activities are disrupted;
- 3) Politics. Indonesia position is burdened to be able to maintain harmonious relations between China and the countries in dispute. The issue of alleged violations of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in Natuna waters by Chinese fishermen and its Coast Guard that occurred is certainly still heating up, even when President Jokowi came to Natuna in early January 2020.

Even though, Indonesian government through Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed the occurrence of violations of the Indonesian EEZ, including IUU fishing activities, and violations of sovereignty by the Chinese Coast Guard in Natuna waters (Kevin, 2020). This was followed up by summoning the China's Ambassador in Jakarta, and Indonesia to firmly convey a strong protest against the incident. A diplomatic note of protest has also been submitted. Further, in late August 2023, China's Ministry of Natural Resources officially released the latest standard map of China. Beijing's unilateral claim has caused controversy and triggered tensions in relations with several countries in the region (Arbar, 2023).

Indonesia's President Jokowi's idea on Nawacita is to make Indonesia the GMF and to become a sovereign, advanced, independent, strong maritime nation and able to make a positive contribution to regional and world security and peace with national interests. Therefore, regionally, national power of Indonesia indeed has great potential to reach the global maritime fulcrum goal (Saragih, Ramlan, & Putera, 2018).

Indonesia President Jokowi has previously declared a new maritime priority for the Indonesian state in 2016. The decision-taken is seen in the increase in the number of sea fish catches by Indonesian fishermen after the eradication of illegal fishing by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 2019).

At the end, with the policy of eradicating illegal fishing through sinking ships, followed by the development of the national fishing industry, and fishermen began to be given working capital and new ships, so that the economy of fishermen and coastal communities continued to grow. Manurung (2016, p. 92) stated, the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia comprises huge marine resources and has a total land area of 1.9 million square kilometers plus additional 3.2 million square kilometers of ocean lie within its borders. Map of the South China Sea featuring the 'Nine-Dash Line' attached to a May 7, 2009 note verbale from the People's Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in protest of an extended continental shelf declaration by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.



Picture 1. China's Nine Dash Line to Ten Dash Line (since August 28th, 2023)

Source: Institute for China-America Studies (2024) and Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

On Monday, August 28, 2023, on the China Surveying and Mapping Publication Day which coincides with the National Mapping Awareness Week, the Chinese government has released the 2023 Edition of the China Standard Map. The new map released by China is different from the version submitted by China to the UN in 2009 regarding the SCS. Initially, the previous claimed area was only limited by 9 dashes known as nine-dash line, but has now been expanded to 10 or ten-dash line on the grounds that it is drawn to be more representative of China's map in 1948.

Moreover, the difference between the 9 DL and the 10 DL is that the Chinese government deliberately added a new line as a unilateral territorial claim on the east coast of Taiwan and there is one line that is located further into Brunei Darussalam territory as shown on the map below:



Picture 2. China Standard Map 2023 Edition

Source: China's Ministry of Natural Resources Map (2023)

In the map, it can be seen clearly that Beijing's SCS unilateral territorial claims include parts of the EEZs of several countries such as Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, India and Indonesia (Hakim, 2023). The publication of the nine-dash line from 1946 to 1948 refers to the "Map of the Chinese Islands in the South China Sea" published by the Republic of China Land and Water Map Inspection Committee in 1935. The map featured a U-shaped, 11-dashed line encompassing the Spratly and Paracel Islands and others (Sakamoto, 2023). China also used the same line on its officially published map of 1949. Furthermore, to record events as they are based on the timeline, in writing this article the term nine-dash line is more widely utilized.

Ironically, Chinese fishermen who are suspected of often fishing in the area turned out to be one of the main suppliers of imported fish to Indonesia (Citradi, 2020). The problem of illegal fishing in Natuna waters itself began when a Chinese fishing vessel was reported to have entered Natuna waters and carried out fish theft. The vessel was even escorted directly by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel that also entered Natuna waters, precisely in Indonesia's

EEZ, not Indonesia's territorial sea where this zone can be crossed freely. Moreover, a total of 24 Vietnamese vessels based on the automatic identification system (AIS) when the vessels were strongly suspected of carrying out illegal fishing in the Indonesian EEZ in the northern zone of the North Natuna Sea during May 2021 (Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative, 2021).

The marine and fisheries sector has a strategic role in supporting national economic development. Based on the Decree of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Number 47/KEPMENKP/2016 (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan RI, 2016), Indonesia has a large potential for fishery resources, namely: ± 9.9 million tons per year. This condition is the reason Indonesia has become the target of fish theft by fishermen from several neighboring countries including China. This is also based on the Decree of the Indonesian Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Number 50 of 2017, WPPNRI 711 has a fisheries potential of 767,126 tons with a utilization rate of 10.66%.



Picture 3. Location of WPPNRI 711

Source: Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (2016)

The results of surveillance operations carried out by the ministry of maritime affairs and fisheries surveillance vessels from

2005 to 2015 have shown a figure of 1494 fish theft vessels, of which 657 vessels were Indonesian Fishing Vessels (KII) and 837 vessels were Foreign Fishing Vessels (KIA). Illegal fishing activities also often occur in WPPNRI 711, one of which is caused by the weak law enforcement system at sea and the disproportionate strength of the monitoring fleet with the area of sea that is the object of surveillance. An international non-governmental organization of the Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative found a Chinese-flagged ship, namely Lu Rong Yuan Yu 701, entering the North Natuna Sea area on July 22, 2020 (Tempo, 2020).

The automatic identification system (AIS) of foreign ships under the management of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization showed that the ship entered Indonesian waters through the Malacca Strait. The Chinese ship is suspected of committing illegal fishing based on a number of analysis results of the symptoms shown through its operational system. The speed of the ship when the longline was lowered was between 4.5-11.5 square knots.

The fisheries management area of the Republic of Indonesia, hereinafter abbreviated as WPPNRI (Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 2023), is a fisheries management area for fishing and fish farming which includes Indonesian waters, the Indonesian exclusive economic zone, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, swamps and other bodies of water that have the potential to be cultivated in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Literature Review

International Relations of Indonesia's scholars for many years discussed patterns of territorial dispute as a research topic, as well as what happens in SCS territorial dispute. Wacker (2020, p. 92) stated that the People's Republic of China since its founding on October 1, 1949, has undergone fundamental changes in its perception of global politics and the international system, in the role it has been playing at the international stage and with respect to the domestic actors that are involved in foreign policy decision making.

While Juanita and Setiani (2022, p. 93) concerned the enormous pressure in handling the crisis in the North Natuna Sea with China often violating Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea. The frequency of crises in the North Natuna Sea is increasingly frequent and even likely to lead to open conflict between countries in the region. Jakarta's response to the incident was to send fishing vessels from the north coast of Java to catch fish in the Natuna area, thus worsening the situation of local Natuna fishermen. In essence, an effective strategy is needed for handling crises in relations between sovereign countries without disrupting diplomatic relations, and local Natuna fishermen immediately feel the benefits.

In further developments, the presence of the Chinese ship in question which should have operated in the EEZ instead went down to the 24 nautical mile area and became a rival to local fishermen. This is based on the results of an interview in 2023 when the researcher was actively involved in WPPNRI 711 in Batam, Riau Islands.

Diplomatic efforts have been made since 1994 and military implemented policies have not had a significant effect in preventing China's aggressive behavior. Until now, Chinese fishing vessels and the Chinese Coast Guard are still carrying out provocative actions by violating IUU Fishing and Indonesia's EEZ by adhering to the Nine-Dash Line principle, which has disrupted maritime security and harmed Indonesia because it does not respect UNCLOS 1982.

This decision-action by related stakeholders still lead to a prolonged territorial dispute. It means that Natuna fishermen face two threats from foreign vessels presence and direct conflict with fishermen from the north coast of Java (Pantura). The researchers aim to analyze the proper strategies that Indonesian government has carried out in dealing with the crisis in the North Natuna Sea with China by using qualitative methods and triangulation analysis techniques with the concept of national interest and empowerment strategy in persuading local Natuna fishermen to be willing and financially able to go to sea in Zone WPPNRI 711.

Thereafter, it needs also to emphasize the importance of the provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 for Indonesia, as a country with numerous islands and extensive maritime boundaries, which are defined as archipelagic states under the convention (Manurung, 2024). Specifically, these provisions are crucial for resolving the situation in the SCS, where there is a need to prevent the escalation of a dispute into an open conflict between several countries, including China. At present, China is still engaging in negotiations with ten countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, with the aim of establishing a code of conduct (COC) for the SCS. Therefore, in order to promote a regional peaceful and stable environment, ASEAN member-states and China issued the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2024). It reflects how the consensus reached by all Parties gradually on seeking peaceful solution of disputes and pursuing maritime cooperation in maintaining stability harmoniously, instead of not to expanding each other's power globally. ASEAN speeds up negotiations with China on a code of conduct to mitigate the risk of conflicts in the hotly contested SCS. Ten member-states of ASEAN expect to conclude talks with China by 2026 (Ching, 2024).

The huge economic losses and security threats made by the Chinese government continue to occur and at any time might endanger the long-standing relations between Indonesia and China. It should be noted that throughout 2019 to 2020, there have been 26 notes of speech, accompanied by two diplomatic letters and one official statement on the SCS issue from around 12 countries. Most of these diplomatic steps clarify their respective positions on specific legal issues and the SCS issue as a whole. Indonesia took this bold step by sending its notes of speech in May 2020 and June 2020. These notes of speech emphasized that Indonesia firmly does not recognize China's unilateral claim to the nine-dash line (Kembara, 2020).

In addition, for some years, Jakarta's diplomatic relations with Beijing seem harmonious and committed to maintaining regional peace on the surface. But in reality, Indonesia has to swallow the bitter pill of tolerance limits that China has continued to impose in the North Natuna Sea since 2016 (Manurung, 2016, p. 94). Indonesia actually has a large potential for

fishery resources, which is 26,606,000 hectares. This potential regional conflict requires special attention in the proper and measurable management process by all related stakeholders.

China's deliberate violations seem to test the patience of policymakers in Indonesia, which is now increasing with stagnant escalation, making this crisis a crisis that will never end and Indonesian diplomacy is just going around in circles. However, researchers found something relevant that Indonesia has the monumental opportunity to manage the crisis by involving local Natuna fishermen to have authority or power rights in the Natuna waters.

Domestically, according to the Governor of the Riau Islands, the reason for bringing in fishermen from the north coast or Pantura of Java was because of the limitations and inability of local Natuna fishermen to go to sea up to 12 miles and above, because the condition of their ships and equipment was inadequate (Wahyuni, 2019, p. 13). This strategy received serious opposition from local Natuna fishermen (Wijaksono et al., 2021, p. 219). This condition becomes the reason why Indonesian waters are always the target of fish theft by fishermen from several neighboring countries annually, especially China and Vietnam. Therefore, there are two threats that local Natuna fishermen still face, namely: first, external threats and second, the threat of horizontal conflict with Pantura Java fishermen.

2. Methods

The method of the study was descriptive qualitative method. It stated research using the natural setting with the intention to interpret the phenomenon occurs and conducted with various methods can be used to interpret phenomena and utilized for qualitative research with various research methods. In qualitative research, the methods normally can be done through interviews, field observations, and utilization of various documents, such as government official documents. Based on this background, the authors want to explore the empowerment strategy for Indonesia's fishermen to be willing and financially able to go to sea in Zone 711 while at the same time also facing the regional threat of Chinese Coast Guard presence and local Pantura Java fishermen deployment.

Triangulation Method

Triangulation methods are used and carried out by collecting data with other methods. In qualitative research, researchers use library research and observation methods. Therefore, to obtain the validity of accurate information and complete projections regarding certain information.

Triangulation Theory

The next method is theoretical triangulation which is the final result of qualitative research consisting of several information formulations. The summary of the information includes, among other things then goes through a comparison stage with relevant theoretical perspectives such as previous research so as not to bias the researcher towards the findings in the research or the conclusions produced. Apart from that, the function of using theoretical triangulation can sharpen the depth of understanding so that researchers are able to explore and dig deeper into theoretical knowledge based on analysis results obtained from various data or sources.

Data Source Triangulation

Data source triangulation method next is used to obtain absolute truth about various specific information by using various data sources such as legal document sources, prepared interview sources with key informants, archival sources, and field observations.

The explanatory qualitative approach method is a qualitative method relying on text and image data. There are various approaches in qualitative research methods, approaches to data collection, writing, and analysis procedures that remain in the social science discipline.

These approaches have emerged and developed in the social sciences since the 1990s (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

This research aims to identify the pattern of empowerment strategy between Indonesian fishermen and related stakeholders, and also show the data of the results of the cooperation pattern continuously. The researcher also provided a complete table taken directly from the official website of the Indonesian government, namely KKP and BAKAMLA as a burden of proof of the results of the illegal fishing activities by foreign vessels, as well as the disclosure of the origin or identity of the perpetrator. The data is taken and then analyzed by reducing the data. Data reduction is processed through selection, focusing on simplifying, abstracting and transforming the rough data that emerges from the field data. After being reduced, the researcher categorizes the data according to needs. For example, data on the amounts of fish, type of illegal fishing, identity of the foreign vessels based on date, informant characteristics, or research location. At this stage, good data interpretation skills are needed so that the data does not fall into the wrong category. Finally, the researcher displays or shows the data, which is a step that needs to be done after reducing and categorizing the data. Data display is an analysis of designing rows and columns of metrics for qualitative data. Based on this design, the researcher can determine the type and form of data to be entered into metric box. Therefore, the use of a qualitative research method with a qualitative explanatory approach is a suitable choice for this research, to describe the results of the cooperation and collaboration of related stakeholders.

3. Results and Discussion

China claims the area based on historical facts since the Han Dynasty in 110 BC. At that time, sea expeditions were carried out to the Spratly Islands and Chinese fishermen and traders had worked and settled in the area. China's claim was strengthened by issuing a nine-dash line map in 1947 and May 2009. Therefore, China's historical claim to the EEZ on the grounds that Chinese fishermen have long been active in the waters in question is unilateral, has no legal basis and has never

been recognized by UNCLOS 1982. This argument has been discussed and refuted by the 2016 SCS Tribunal Decision. Indonesia also rejects the term relevant waters claimed by China because this term is not known and does not comply with UNCLOS 1982. Indonesia urges China to explain the legal basis and clear boundaries regarding China's claim in Indonesia's EEZ based on UNCLOS 1982.

It is not only Indonesia that is at odds with China regarding the SCS. In the ASEAN region, China's claim in the SCS includes the territories of several other countries, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and the Philippines. These countries certainly reject China's claim and try to defend their respective sovereignty.

Philippines government in fact has won a lawsuit at the UN Arbitration Court which stated that China has no legal basis to claim territorial waters in the SCS.

The International Arbitration Court stated that there is no historical evidence that China has exclusive control over resources in the SCS. China emphasized that it does not accept the decision.

The Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia consider China's unilateral claim to its territory in the SCS to be baseless because it only refers to historical factors and there is no written agreement. This makes the claim very subjective and inconsistent with International Law practices.

In the UNCLOS 1982, national sovereignty over sea areas is determined by the distance from the outermost point or island of a country. Based on UNCLOS 1982, the islands in the Natuna Sea of Indonesia are naturally formed land areas surrounded by water and which are above the water surface at high tide.

The reality of China's expansion ambitions for some years has raised regional security concerns about Beijing's increasing sovereignty over disputed areas, especially if territorial violation practices are allowed to continue. It is feared that the presence of Chinese fishermen in overlapping areas is not merely an ordinary Illegal Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing activity. Escort facilities from Chinese Coast Guard ships are part of the indicator of the scenario of territorial control under the pretext of China's nine-dash line history which is also an option for economic sovereignty expansion at sea.



Picture 4. Map of LK Boundaries, EEZ and Additional Zone of Indonesia in Natuna

Source: Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan Kabupaten Natuna (2023)

Indonesia geostrategic location known worldwide as an archipelagic country with a diverse society consisting of various ethnicities, religions, and cultural uniqueness. It is actually the largest archipelagic country in the world which has a very important geostrategic position, especially in the waters of the North Natuna Sea.

Its strategic geographical location makes Indonesia an important key in international maritime trade routes. In addition, this water area is also rich in natural resources, including fisheries and potential energy resources such as oil and gas. Maritime security in the North Natuna Sea region is crucial in maintaining state sovereignty and ensuring Indonesia's economic and political stability. National economic resilience also guarantees the independence and stability of the nation's economy, so that it is able to face various turmoil and crises within the country.



Picture 5. Indonesia National Patrol Activities in 2022

Source: BAKAMLA RI (2022)

The National Joint Patrol, which has been ongoing since August 2022, is the first national maritime security and safety patrol to be carried out since the enactment of Government Regulation Number 13 of 2022 concerning the Implementation of Security, Safety, and Law Enforcement in Indonesian waters and Indonesian jurisdictional areas. The 2022 national patrol operation involves the Navy, Air Force, Army, POLRI, BAKAMLA, Customs, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. The aim is to improve security and safety in Indonesian waters and Indonesian jurisdictional areas and to create synergy for the implementation of effective and efficient patrols in the use of resources while still prioritizing national security aspects in preventing territorial violations (GARWIL), illegal entry, illegal oil, drugs, and explosives.

The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) confirmed that so far it has not found any activity by Chinese coast guard vessels (CCG) that endangers the activities of Indonesian vessels in the North Natuna Sea, despite the incident of Indonesia expelling by KN Pulau Dana-323 and KN Tanjung Datu at CCG ship in the North Natuna Sea (Antara, 2024). BAKAMLA routinely patrols the North Natuna Sea throughout the year, apart from the incident of expelling a Chinese coast guard ship in October 2024. However, it is still necessary to boost the number of Indonesian patrol vessels in strategic areas, especially in the Malacca Strait, in North Natuna, and in Ambalat waters.

Table Illegal Fishing (2019 – 2023)

No	Origin of the Ship	Number of Ships				2023
		2019	2020	2021	2022	
1	Foreign Fishing Vessels					
	a. Malaysia	14	16	18	4	5
	b. Vietnam	29	23	29	9	7
	c. Philippines	23	18	5	5	4
	d. Taiwan	-	1	1	-	1
2	Indonesian Fishing Vessels	125	58	114	79	252
	TOTAL	191	126	167	97	269

Source: Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (2023)

In the context of Asia and Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a country that has the largest sea. In the context of head to head between Indonesian fisheries performance and other countries in ASEAN (Ismail et al., 2018, p. 3): 1) The productivity level per ship in Indonesia is only 6.7 tons per year, Thailand 137.86 tons per year, and Vietnam 19.48 tons per year and Malaysia more than 30 tons per year; 2) The contribution to the country's GDP, Vietnam reaches 21%, Malaysia 10%, and Thailand 10% while Indonesia is only 3%; 3) The number of poor people on the coast in Indonesia reached 33,768,000 (13%), in Vietnam it reached 12,440,000 (5%), in China it reached 11,750,700 (5%), in the Philippines it reached 11,247,000 (4%), and in Myanmar 6,209,340 (2%) (FAO, 2010), most of whom live on the coast; 4) The contribution of the fisheries sector in Indonesia to GDP (2006) in Indonesia was 1.9%, in Malaysia 1.1%, in Thailand 1.6%, in Myanmar 9.9%.

Maritime security and national resilience have a very close relationship and influence each other, especially for an archipelagic country like Indonesia. National resilience ensures that Indonesia has the capabilities and national component strength to defend its sovereignty from internal and external threats.

However, in reality, the current state of maritime security implementation in the North Natuna Sea still faces problems. The main problems are related to regulatory policies that often overlap, weak law enforcement, lack of coordination and intense communication, limited human resources, and the bureaucratic structure of maritime security. Meanwhile, the condition of maritime security in the North Natuna Sea globally is one of the challenges, especially related to geopolitical and geostrategic perspectives. Global geopolitical dynamics, including competition between major countries, regional conflicts, and the emergence of non-state actors, have a significant impact on Indonesia's national security.

Violations in the fisheries sector that occurred in the Indonesian EEZ waters in the North Natuna Sea by Chinese and Vietnamese foreign fishing vessels are a threat and disruption to maritime security that affects the economic conditions in the region. The illegal activities of these foreign fishing vessels have caused the catch of fish by Natuna fishermen to decline, as evidenced by the fish catch over the past 2 to 3 years decreasing by up to 200% (Supriatna, 2021). Government policies related to maritime security in the North Natuna Sea cover various aspects, such as conflict control, IUU Fishing monitoring, resource management, and infrastructure development.

Lack of coordination among government ministries and related institutions lead to overlapping tasks and slow responses to emerging threats. The use of integrated information systems and real-time sharing of intelligence data between various maritime security agencies is essential for a quick and effective response to maritime threats. In addition, the resource aspect also has a significant impact.

On the other hand, the quality and quantity of maritime security human resources are very important. Supporting personnel who are well-trained and have special skills in maritime operations, law enforcement, and the use of advanced technology are urgently needed. Continuous training and capacity development must be a priority. The issue of budget constraints is often a major obstacle in the implementation of maritime security policies. Adequate funding is needed to support maritime patrol operations, procurement of surveillance technology, and maintenance of infrastructure. More specifically, the availability of patrol vessels, radars, drones, and satellite-based monitoring systems is essential. Supporting infrastructure

such as ports, military bases, and command centers must be adequate to support effective maritime operations.

Moreover, China stated that it is ready to resolve the issue in the North Natuna waters bilaterally with Indonesia. Jakarta's stance its position and continue to be consistent with the United Nations Convention Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 agreement along with Indonesia free and active foreign policy implementation. The entry of Chinese fishing vessels into Indonesian waters and the protection of the coast guard shows opposition to UNCLOS 1982, especially regarding the EEZ. On that basis, it is appropriate for Indonesia to summon the Chinese Ambassador in Jakarta Xiao Qian to convey a strong protest to Beijing.

China as a member of UNCLOS 1982 must submit to the mutual agreement, and Indonesia should be more active in preventing unilateral claim from expanding its territory arbitrarily by, among other things, increasing the empowerment of fishermen who are willing and able to go to sea in disputed areas.

Therefore, the local fishermen of Natuna can be empowered as part of the Indonesian sea guards independently in overcoming fish theft that is counter to China's ambitious occupation. The Indonesian government has repeatedly emphasized that it rejects China's claim regarding the China 9 Dash Line of un-justification and groundless. Moreover, based on the 9 Dash Line and continue with 10 Dash Line map in August 2023, it can be viewed that Beijing's claim covers 90 percent or almost the entire waters of the SCS.

4. Conclusion

The empowerment strategy for fishermen in Zone 711 (WPPNRI 711) by the central government and especially the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) together with related stakeholders must be comprehensive, involving various parties ranging from the government, non-governmental organizations, to the fishermen community itself. With a community-based approach, education, provision of facilities, and strong policy support, it is hoped that Indonesian fishermen can be more financially independent and able to utilize the potential of marine resources sustainably. This empowerment will not only improve the welfare and economic empowerment of fishermen but also contribute to the sustainability of the marine ecosystem in Indonesia.

The results of the study indicate that committed policy and appropriate strategies still are needed to encourage the effectiveness of the expected results by prioritizing local Natuna fishermen as part of the solution, with maximum coordination between the Indonesian Navy, BAKAMLA (Maritime Security Agency), POLRI, and the Natuna fishermen community. The researcher suggests that the Central Government coordinate with stakeholders to form a Fishermen's Sovereignty Patrol Team accompanied by BAKAMLA and KKP as a concrete action to maintain the sovereignty and sovereign rights of professional fishermen to facilitate modern and survivable fishing vessels in the North Natuna Sea as a form of national defense, increasing nationalism, and empowering the economy of local Natuna fishermen.

In addition, it is necessary to initiate academic, business and government (ABG) communities' presence to continue to work together to support the local fishermen's economics boost. This can be done by optimizing the role of academics in the form of innovations creatively in developing fishing vessels with affordable prices and high quality, entrepreneurship skills in the form of capital funding assistance for coastal community fisheries day-to-day businesses, along with the central and local government coordination in the form of policy incentives. Writer expects local fishermen will be more willing and able to go to sea in zone 711 financially and have a significant impact on strengthening the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia in the North Natuna Sea. The related stakeholders' initiation on the ABG communities supports is needed to empower sustainably the social engineering of a more advanced seafaring culture through efforts to procure more modern vessels and provide stimulus that has an impact on encouraging Indonesian local fishermen to carry out daily fishing activities.

The balance between the roles and relevant contribution of government and the private sector also should be further improved continuously in managing national waters and fishermen in the 711 Zone. Various sea toll routes must be focused on non-commercial routes, while commercial routes need to be given to private operators and state-owned companies.

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